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OF SHARES, SECURITIES, AND STAKES:
THE CHINESE INSIDER TRADING LAW
AND THE STAKEHOLDER THEORY OF LEGAL
ANALYSIS
Brian Daly*
I. INTRODUCTION
After the 1949 Chinese Revolution, Chinese society frequently restrict-
ed or challenged the idea of private ownership of capital in China. In
fact, the notion of private, third party ownership of enterprises, through
shares or other means, was largely unthinkable.2 The dismantling of the
financial centers in Shangha was testament, on both a local and a na-
tional level, to the official attitude toward passive income.4 For better
or worse, a national distaste for passive income characterized national
policy for thirty years 5 The economic reforms in the post-Mao era
* Associate, O'Melveny & Myers, New York. .LD. (with distinction) Stanford
Law School 1996; MA. East-West Center-University of Hawaii 1993; B.A. Catholic
University of America 1991, phi beta kappa. I would like to thank Yanping Cao for
her detailed reading of the paper and her numerous suggestions for improvement,
Professor William Simon for his comments on the methodology of the argument,
Professor Lu Song of Beijing Foreign Affairs College and the staff of the East Asian
Collection at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace for helping me
locate the Chinese language materials, and the staff of the AUJILP for their hard
work.
1. See ALEXANDER EcKSTmN, CHINA'S ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 26-30 (1977)
(discussing the state of the Chinese economy after 1949).
2. Cf Thomas C. Casey, Taking Stock of China: An Executive Examines
Nation's Interest in Capitalism, LA. TItlES, Sept. 26, 1988, at 6 (discussing China's
newfound interest in free-market principles).
3. See id. (noting that the Shanghai stock market flourished prior to 1949).
4. The author has borrowed the term "passive income" from the United States tax
code, see LR.C. § 1296(b)(1) (1996), to call attention to the fact that many govern-
ments treat passive earnings differently than income earned from labor or other "ordi-
nary income."
5. See generally ROBERT C. HSu, ECONOMIC THEORMS IN CHINA, 1979-1988, at
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(1978-present) challenged these taboos, 6 and the "opening-up policy
[duiwai kaifang zhengce]" extended the domestic economic reforms to
include foreign participation in an increasingly capitalist interpretation of
"socialism with Chinese characteristics."'
Approximately fifteen years after the initial domestic economic re-
forms, the capital markets are still in an early stage of development."
The Chinese securities markets are charged with the task of building a
bridge between domestic enterprises and sources of capital, and must
efficiently manage the exchanges in order to shore up confidence in the
Chinese capital markets as a whole.'0 Not surprisingly, the challenges
of regulating these markets are great:" Undertrained and understaffed
government regulators must tackle such problems as insufficient disclo-
sure, insider trading, and shareholder rights in a precedential vacuum.'2
In addition, the Chinese markets must study and quickly achieve the
standards of transparency and equitable operation that the major world
markets have developed over decades and centuries.
The knotty problem of insider trading is an excellent example of the
difficulties that the Chinese regulators must confront. Chinese efforts to
combat insider trading demonstrate the government's ability to react to
53-54 (1991) (explaining socialism's emphasis on production rather than economic
wealth derived from passive income).
6. See HARRY HARDING, CHINA'S SECOND REVOLUTrION: REFORM AFrER MAO
99-130 (examining the restructuring of the Chinese economy since 1978).
7. See Timothy A. Steinert, Note, If the Bit Fits: The Proposed Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaty Between the United States and the People's Republic of China, 2 J. CHI-
NESE L. 405, 423 (1988) (discussing China's policy of opening up to foreign invest-
ment and trade relations); see also Bing Song, Competition Policy in a Transitional
Economy, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 387, 390 n.9 (1995) (noting that numerous economists
and policy advisers assisted China's economic reform and "opening-up" policy).
8. Jerome A. Cohen, Contract Legislation and the PRC's Developing Legal Sys-
tem: Creating an Environment Congenial to Foreign Business, in CONTRACT LAWS OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPtJBuc OF CHINA 3, 6-10 (Jerome A. Cohen et al. eds., 1988).
9. See Tony Walker, Emerging Markets: Rough Riding Ahead in China, FIN.
TtM s, Feb. 21, 1994, at 23 (discussing China's initial attempts to formulate a securi-
ties law and regulatory structure).
10. See James Stemgold, Step Taken Toward Creating Securities Market in China,
MPLS.-ST. PAUL STAR TRm., Aug. 26, 1990, at J2 (noting that a viable securities
market would more effectively allocate capital to businesses and facilitate greater
overall business efficiency).
11. Walker, supra note 9, at 23 (recognizing that the task for China's emerging
regulatory system is difficult in the climate of China's rapid and chaotic economic
transformation).
12. Id.
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market demands in an incremental, yet rapid, manner. Most importantly,
the development of an insider trading jurisprudence demonstrates the im-
portance of "stakeholders" in the legal system. As investment opportuni-
ties in the Chinese equity market grew, government drafters increasingly
focused their attention on the abuses in, and deficiencies of, the securi-
ties markets.1 3 Because more citizens are holding financial stakes in the
efficient and fair operation of the market, and more Chinese enterprises
are becoming dependent on the influx of capital through the stock ex-
changes, the Chinese government is investing more resources in confi-
dence-improving measures, such as the drafting of insider trading legis-
lation, and in the hiring and training of securities regulators. The efforts
and influence of such a broad group of stakeholders will ensure that the
insider trading laws succeed where other laws, such as intellectual prop-
erty laws, have failed.
This article intends to fulfill two goals. First, this article will provide
a comprehensive summary of the current state of the law of insider
trading in China. Second, this article will illustrate the feasibility of a
meaningful implementation of such laws in China through the use of a
"stakeholder jurisprudence," which provides a realistic method for evalu-
ating the implementation of a new law in a developing legal environ-
ment, such as China.
II. THE CREATION OF STAKEHOLDERS IN THE CHINESE
SECURITIES MARKETS
The theory of stakeholder capitalism is recently a subject of much
public discussion, particularly in Great Britain.' 4 Tony Blair, the leader
of the British Labor Party, adopted this theory,'5 which promotes a vi-
sion of the national economy in which all citizens are meaningful partic-
ipants, 6 and enterprises make decisions after weighing the impact of
the decision on the enterprise's financial health and examining the ef-
13. See id (discussing China's increasing interest in free-market principles).
14. Unhappy Families: Stakeholder Capitalism, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996. at 23;
see John Kampfner, Labour Plan on Pension Reform: Insurance Groups Would Work
With Unions and Employers, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 15. 1996. at 1 (recognizing stakeholder
principles in Britain's pension reform plans).
15. See Unhappy Families: Stakeholder Capitalism, supra note 14, at 23 (discuss-
ing the use of stakeholder capitalism principles in Germany and Japan and Blair's
promotion of the theory in Britain).
16. Hotels and Planes, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 1996, at 17.
19961 973
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fects of the decision on the rest of society.' 7 By giving all citizens a
"stake" in macro- and micr6-economic decisions, 8 proponents of this
theory hope to create a society that benefits all, and achieves legitimacy
and wins support from all sectors of the economy.
Although the stakeholder economy vision may well be a political
ploy,19 and the economics of implementing a stakeholder version of a
company law may prove unworkable,20 the inclusive ideal it proposes
is not necessarily flawed. It may, in fact, be an excellent tool for ana-
lyzing the legal systems of many developing nations, including China.
An analysis that uses a stakeholder jurisprudence may explain the schi-
zophrenia of the Chinese political and legal system in adapting to the
requirements of the global economy.
In order to draft a legitimate and realistically enforceable law under a
stakeholder jurisprudence, not only must the lawmakers consider the
general well-being of the society, but a wide cross-section of citizens
must agree that the law is in their own interests. Just as a stakeholder
economy would enjoy widespread support from the populace, a stake-
holder jurisprudence would earn the necessary endorsement of the citi-
zenry. The converse also rings true: just as the economic non-represen-
tation in the warlord period of the Republic of China engendered the
Communist Revolution,2 a legal system without stakeholders will lead
to the rejection of unpopular laws, and possibly the entire Chinese legal
system. 22
A stakeholder jurisprudence would measure the strength of a law or a
legal system by examining implementation and enforcement, rather than
17. Id.
18. Unhappy Families: Stakeholder Capitalism, supra note 14, at 23.
19. Cf. Anthony King, Voters Left Baffled by "Stakeholder Society," DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 12, 1996, at 8 (stating that most voters have never even
heard of the term "stakeholder society").
20. See Sir Stanley Kalms, Dangerous Concepts for a Market Economy, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1996, at 14 (Letter to the Editor) (suggesting that the stakeholder
policy may promote dangerous socialist policies); CITY, PENSION FUNDS Hit OUT AT
BLAIR VISION, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 23, 1996, at 25 (warning that the
diversion of company shareholder returns in a stakeholder economy would deter inves-
tors from investing new capital).
21. Cf. ANN KENT, BETWEEN FREEDOM AND SUBsIsTENcE: CHINA AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 42 (1993) (tracing the historical link in the human rights movement and ex-
plaining how the Chinese Communist Party was able to gain power as a result of the
Kuomintang's inability to deal with its unrepresentative government).
22. Id. Kent then discusses the Kuomintang's emphasis on the rule of law, which
was meaningless to the poor majority of the people. Id.
974 [VOL. 11:6
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the codification or the stated intent of certain laws. Like the critical
legal studies approach, a stakeholder jurisprudence focuses on implemen-
tation. But while the critical legal studies approach looks to the underly-
ing intents of the legal authority,24 a stakeholder jurisprudence looks to
the interests of the groups that influence the legal authority?' In the
stakeholder interpretation, the government is merely a reflection of the
largest or most powerful group of stakeholders. A stakeholder analysis
also accounts for the fluidity of politics; the power of groups of
stakeholders may vary over time and government policies reflect the
changes in their relative strengths. It can also account for an imbalance
of power between small, powerful, well-organized stakeholders, and
larger, more diffuse groups with a contrary stake.
In nations like China, where the rule of law is still developing and
the government is still more dependent on individual personalities than
institutional influence,6 one may utilize the stakeholder jurisprudence
to examine legal developments. At the proposal or passage of a new
law, it should be possible to estimate the relative strengths of the stakes
different groups have in endorsing or opposing the implementation of
the law by using a "stakeholder jurisprudence analysis." By examining
the different implementations of the legal regimes of insider trading and
intellectual property rights, one may identify groups of stakeholders that
have a strong interest in reducing insider trading, but no interest in
intellectual property rights. This analysis allows one to predict and as-
sess the future enforcement of insider trading laws, in spite of what
might seem to be the failure in the enforcement of intellectual property
laws.
One may find a second, and potentially greater, application of stake-
holder jurisprudence in the potential for reverse engineering adminis-
trative actions and judicial decisions. Stakeholder jurisprudence analysis
allows observers to refine their estimates of the relative power of groups
in China, and provides some answers to questions on legal develop-
ments.
23. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (propounding that the frame of
reference in a stakeholder analysis is the individual and how the individual can influ-
ence the system).
24. See generally Mark V. Tushnet, Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 239 (examining the foundations of critical legal studies).
25. See supra notes 14-18, 21 and accompanying text (suggesting that stakeholder
analysis focuses on citizen influence in the legal system).
26. See Walker, supra note 9, at 23 (discussing China's initial attempts to formu-
late a securities law and regulatory structure).
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A. BACKGROUND TO THE CHINESE SECuRmES MARKETS
The trials of the "gang of four" 7 and the forced retirement of Hua
Guofeng,' which followed the death of Mao Zedong, marked the end
of the Maoist era of Chinese politics.29 These events also marked the
end of the command economy and the peculiar economic practices of
China in the years immediately following the 1949 Liberation, as well
as during the Cultural Revolution." One of Mao's bequests was a na-
tion in economic shambles, s' and the reformist group that succeeded
Hua focused on reviving the economy.32 Under the leadership of Deng
Xiaoping, the Chinese economy grew dramatically.33  Such rapid
growth, however, may sometimes be a precursor to "growing broke,
' 34
as many young businesses have discovered. The growth of the economy
as a whole was so dramatic that, by the late 1980s, the government and
many enterprises, both privately and publicly owned, sorely needed cash
infusions.35 A bond market was introduced in 1981 to meet the liquidi-
ty needs of the government,36 but the bond market did not address the
urgent needs of many private or privatizing enterprises for equity invest-
ment capital.37
27. Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan. See HAR-
DING, supra note 6, at 49.
28. Id. at 48-69.
29. See id. (tracing the economic predicament China faced after Mao's death,
leading to Deng Xiaoping's subsequent rise to power). See also Samuel S. Kim, The
Development of International Law in Post-Mao China: Change and Continuity, 1 J.
CHINESE L. 117, 125 n.30 (1987) (delineating China's shift away from a domestically
focused and centralized economy in the post-Mao period). Cf Lucy A. Williams &
Margaret Y.K. Woo, The "Worthy" Unemployed: Societal Stratification and Unemploy-
ment Insurance Programs in China and the United States, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 457, 461 (1995) (emphasizing the command economy of the Maoist period and its
strict control of business and labor).
30. HARDING, supra note 6, at 99-130.
31. Id.
32. Robert F. Dernberger & David Fasenfest, China's Post-Mao Economic Future,
in 1 STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., Chinese Economy
Post-Mao 3, 3-5 (Joint Comm. Print 1978).
33. Joyce Barnathan, China; Birth of a New Economy, BUS. WK., Jan. 31, 1994, at 42.
34. Cf. Robert C. Higgins, ANALYSIS FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 121 (4th ed.
1995).
35. Hsu, supra note 5, at 68.
36. Id.
37. Benjamin R. Tarbutton, China--A National Regulatory Framework For The PRC's
Stock Markets Begins To Emerge, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 411, 411 (1994). See GANG
976 [VOL. 11:6
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The Chinese government was aware of the crisis private enterprises
faced, and responded with a further development of debt markets,3 3 and
with plans for the creation of a market for the public trading of equi-
ty 9 After much internal debate on the wisdom and correctness of a
public equity exchange,' the government reached a consensus,4 and
in 1987, the first public issue of equity securities took place on the
Shenzhen exchange 2 The first efforts at an equity market were hum-
ble, but development has been rapid." By the end of 1995, there were
two stock exchanges (the Shanghai Stock Exchange4 and the Shenzhen
Yi, MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKERS IN CHINA 257-62 (1994) (illustrating the
increase from the exclusive issue of government bonds in 1981, to an expansion in govern-
ment approved securities markets in 1986). From 1981 to 1991, the total amount of financial
securities issued in China was RMB 377 billion, only 7.54 billion of which were stocks. Id.
at 257.
38. Including trading in national debt futures (guozhai qihuo) and bond redemp-
tions (guozhai huigou). ZHONGGUO SHICHANG FAZHAN BAOGAO [CHINA MARKEr DE-
VELoPMEvNT REPORT] 95 (Sun Shangqing et al. eds., 1995).
39. For a concise history of the early development of Chinese securities markets,
see DONG SHIZHONG ET AL, TRADE & INVEMNT OPPORTUNITIES IN CHINA 62-67
(1992), and DOROTHY SOLINGER, CHINA'S TRANSION FROM SOcIALis,: STATIST
LEGACIEs AND MARKEr REFonis 1980-1990, 134-37 (1993). For a related, though
distinct, discussion of the history of the shareholding system, see KEUN LEE, CHINESE
FORMs AND THE STATE IN TRANSITION: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND AGENCY PROBLEMS
IN THE REFoni ERA 81-98 (1991).
40. SOLINGER, supra note 39, at 134.
41. See id. (stating that the agreement on stock companies vras probably inevita-
ble when one considers, as one author has commented, that stock issues are "the
ideal way to collect capital while at the same time avoiding possible worker discon-
tent.").
42. Andrew Quinn, China's Southern Stock Market Butts Heads with Beiing,
REuTER WORLD SERVICE, July 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txprim
File.
43. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (noting the development of the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges).
44. The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) was established on November 26, 1990,
and began operations on December 19, 1990. pursuant to the State Council and
People's Bank of China (PBOC) approval. BEIJING INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FI-
NANCE, THE BANKING SYSTEM OF CHINA 217-220 (1993). The SSE is a legal person,
which operates under a membership system. Members are financial institutions ap-
proved by the PBOC to conduct securities business in Shanghai. Id. The PBOC's
approval of these institutions is dependent upon the fulfillment of the requirements of
RMB 10 million of registered capital, two years of profitable operations and other
criteria. ld. The securities listed on the SSE include national government bonds, pro-
vincial government bonds, and stock and equity certificates. Id. Four groups jointly
administer these securities: (1) a member assembly (the supreme organ), (2) a council
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Stock Exchange 5) with over 1,700 trading offices; a computerized quo-
tation system; 304 listed companies; 91 securities companies; 1,200 trust
and investment firms; 150,000 trained industry professionals; 10 million
shareholders nationwide; and a total market capitalization of 409 billion
yuan.46
B. CAPITAL STRUCrtURE OF LISTED COMPANiES
Given the fact that China's economic condition is the result of an
unusual history,47 and that the Chinese government created the equity
markets to perform a specific function,' it is not surprising to find that
the capital structure of Chinese firms differs somewhat from those of
other nations. While companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) often have only one or two classes of stock (e.g., common or
preferred49), the Chinese stocks consist of two classes, three pools, and
five categories.50
The different "pools" of stocks in Chinese companies represent groups
of shares available to strictly defined groups of potential purchasers."
These three pools of stocks include state shares (guojia gu), legal person
shares (gongsi gu or faren gu) and individual shares (geren gu).52 Only
the individual shares are traded on the domestic stock markets in any
of directors (a standing committee that decides on the SSE's routine activities), (3) a
board of supervisors, and (4) a general manager. Id.
45. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (ZSE) began centralized trading on December
1, 1990, and obtained permission for official establishment from the PBOC on April
11, 1991. Id. at 224-25. The ZSE also operates according to the membership system.
Id.
46. "Round-up" on Securities Market Growth, XINHUA, Dec. 20, 1995, reprinted
in FBIS DAILY REPORT-CHFNA, Dec. 29, 1995, at 51, 51, FBIS-CHI-95-244; Expan-
sion of Securities Industry Outlined, XINHUA, Nov. 25, 1995, reprinted in F3IS DAI-
LY REPORT-CHINA, 27 Nov. 1995, at 38, 38, FBIS-CHI-95-227; YI, supra note 37,
at 257.
47. See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Chinese polit-
ical economy after Mao's death).
48. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (noting that the Chinese equity
markets were developed in order to provide investment capital for private enterprises).
49. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 317, 320-21 (4th ed. 1991).
50. See generally Yi-Chen Zhang & Da Yu, China's Emerging Securities Market,
29 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., 113, 119 (1994) (examining the Chinese equity market
structure).
51. Id.
52. Id.
978 [VOL. 11:6
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noticeable volume.53 Thus, the remainder of this article will focus pri-
marily on the individual shares traded on China's markets.
In addition to the three pools of stocks, there are five categories of
shares, differentiated by eligible buyers, denominating currency, and the
listing location. 4 The first category is the A-share (A gu). A-shares re-
fleet most of the common elements of stock ownership. There are two
classes of A-shares: common and preferred 5 Voting rights are allocat-
ed on the basis of one-share-one-vote,s which is a universally recog-
nized arrangement. A-shares are listed on the national exchanges, where
the principal and dividends of the stock are denominated in the local
currency (the Chinese yuan, or renminbi (RMB))?' The unusual feature
of the A-shares is that both classes are limited to domestic purchas-
ers.58 The exclusion of foreign investors from a market denominated in
a semi-convertible currency serves, ironically, as a double obstacle to
foreign investment, which is one of the reasons for establishing a secu-
rities market
59
53. Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Why Does Not the Rising Water Lift the Boat?, 29
INT'L LAw. 615, 626 (1995). The trading of faren gu has been actively discouraged
by the central government. Renee Lai, New Market Stagnates: Investors Believe Legal-
Persons Shares May Be Phased Out, S. CHINA MORNING PoST, June 2, 1994. at 5.
54. Zhang & Yu, supra note 50, at 119.
55. YI, supra note 37, at 265.
56. For a comprehensive discussion of voting and other shareholder rights in Chi-
na, see Matthew D. Latimer, Gilding the Iron Rice Bowl: The Illusion of Shareholder
Rights in China, 69 WAsH. L. RFv. 1097, 1097-1119 (1994).
57. Zhang & Yu, supra note 50, at 119.
58. Id.
59. With full convertibility of the renminbi likely in the near future, this has
become less of a structural impediment to foreign investment in A-shares. See Bank
Official On Renminbi's Convertibility, XUNHA NEws AGENCY, Sept. 7. 1994, avail-
able in VESTLAW, Allnews Database, 1994 W'L 9100461 (noting that convertibility
of the renminbi is a goal for the Chinese foreign currency management system). Per-
haps with the convertibility of the renminbi, there will no longer be a justification for
the severance of the A- and B-share markets, thus compelling the Chinese government
to reexamine the efficacy of the B-share system. In the meantime, however, deriva-
tives and swap contracts make it possible for a determined overseas investor to as-
sume the risks of an A-share investment.
At present, there are three possible methods for purchasing A-shares. One ap-
proach is for the Chinese investor to purchase a portfolio of A-shares pursuant to the
instructions of the foreign speculator, while the foreign investor, in exchange, purchas-
es a portfolio (of equal value) of stocks, bonds or any other financial instruments that
the Chinese investor chooses. The two parties would then enter into a contract stipu-
lating that at the end of a fixed term, each party will either give the other party the
1996] 979
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In 1991, the Chinese government responded to this dilemma by open-
ing the equity markets to foreign capital through the creation of the B-
share (B gu).' B-shareholders are entitled to the same voting and other
rights as common A-shareholders, and both principal and dividends are
denominated in renminbi.6' Unlike an A-share common stock, however,
B-shares are only available to foreigners and must be purchased with
foreign currency.62 To issue B-shares, a company must satisfy a num-
ber of government requirements,63 which effectively limit foreign par-
gains derived from the investment, or request payment for the loss in value of the
portfolio. The execution of this transaction confers upon each party the risks and
returns of the counterparty's portfolio, thereby thwarting the government's efforts to
separate the two types of shares. Cf. Equity Swaps Explained, RISK, Nov. 1995, at 37
(discussing equity swaps in Thailand). Of course, the problem with this approach is
the lack of infrastructure (there is no clearinghouse to enforce margin calls or find
another counterparty in the event of a breach) and limited legal recourse. In the event
of a breach, the Chinese courts will likely refuse to enforce the contract. At the same
time, it will be difficult for an American court to enforce a judgment against a Chi-
nese party with no overseas assets to which the court may attach. See Nick Reed,
Simplest of Swaps Suit Citic Pacific, RISK (AslARISK SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT), Nov.
1995, at 49 (discussing the dangers of complicated derivative transactions in China).
A second approach is for an American speculator to find another American
party willing to bet against him on the performance of a predetermined portfolio of
A-shares. As long as price information from the Chinese exchanges is freely available,
the two parties can enter into a contract to pay or collect from the other party the
fluctuations of the A-share portfolio. Thus, for example, party A will pay party B for
any increase in the portfolio and party B will then pay party A for any decrease in
the portfolio value. The systemic risk of this type of transaction is the insolvency of
the counterparty, and the difficulty of finding suitable substitute counterparties.
Finally, a third approach for foreign A-share participation is an investment in a
"unit trust" that is allowed to trade in A-shares. See Chua Chwee Leng, Entering The
Country Via Unit Trusts, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), July 18, 1992, at EL8 (describing
the investment strategy of buying into unit trusts that maintain a portfolio of Chinese
equities and are not limited to investments in B-shares). This alternative is likely to
be the most appealing option to investors determined to invest in, or speculate on, A-
shares. The advantage of this third method, from a macro-economic perspective, is
that it is the only option that allows the transaction to have an effect on prices. Im-
proving the price discovery in the market makes for a more efficient market, and
lowers the costs for capital raising.
60. See Zhang & Yu, supra note 50, at 119 (outlining the primary market for B-
shares).
61. Id.
62. Yi, supra note 37, at 265; State Council Sets National Rules on B-Shares,
XINHUA, Jan 2, 1996, reprinted in FBIS DAILY REPORT, Jan 3, 1996, at 43, FBIS-
CHI-96-002.
63. Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the
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ticipation to the least risky companies.6 Despite these limits, B-shares
have proved to be enormously popular.65 In the three months following
the first B-share issue in November 1991, RMB 385 million worth of B-
shares were sold.6
The successful results of the B-share experiment prompted the govern-
ment to expand B-share issuances in the subsequent years. " In addition
to the third category, known as C-shares, which are largely non-tradable
corporate shares in the company,' foreign listings belong to two cate-
gories of shares.' H-shares, also referred to as "red chips" [hongchout
gu] in Chinese, are stocks of Chinese companies listed on the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE).70 N-shares are New York-listed
stocks,7 and exist in the form of American Depository Receipts.
Both the H- and N-share listings allow for foreign capital injections into
Chinese enterprises 3 under conditions that encourage broader participa-
tion! 4 A stock listed on the NYSE or the HKSE signifies the
company's compliance with the requirements of the American Securities
and Exchange Commission or the Hong Kong Securities Futures Com-
mission,7 which bolsters the confidence of foreign investors.
7 6
Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L J. 62, 90-
91 (1993). See State Council Sets National Rules on B-Shares, supra note 62, at 43
(noting that for issuance of B-shares, a company must make twenty-five percent of its
shares available to the public and maintain a foreign exchange account within China).
64. State Council Sets National Rules on B-Shares, supra note 62, at 43.
65. China To Open More Cities To Overseas Finance Firms, AGENCE FR-
PRESSE, June 22, 1992, available in WESTLANV, AFP-Eng Database, 1992 WL
8499845.
66. Id.
67. Present, Future of Stock Market Examined, ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO
[CHINESE SEC. NEws], Nov. 30, 1995, at 8, translated in FBIS DAiLY RE-
PORT-CHINA, Jan. 4, 1996, at 36, 38, FBIS-CI-96-003 [hereinafter Stock Market].
68. Qian, supra note 53, at 626.
69. See id at 627 (outlining the international stock markets as H-shares for Hong
Kong listings and N-shares for New York listings).
70. Id. at 622, 626.
71. Id. at 626.
72. Id.
73. See Stock Market, supra note 67, at 38 (noting the influence of increased
state revenue and absorption of foreign capital on the developmetn of industries and
the increased public awareness and interest in investing and finance).
74. Id.
75. Cf Securities Act of 1933 § 6 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77(f) (1994)) (outlin-
ing SEC registration for public offerings in the United States).
76. See Sondra IV. Dunn, Dealing With China: H-Share Appeal Dims, But Isn't
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C. IDENTIFYING THE STAKEHOLDERS IN CHINA'S SECURITIES MARKETS
This effort at encouraging both domestic and foreign investment into
the Chinese equities markets resulted in the development of several
groups with vested interests in the efficiency and fairness of the Chinese
capital markets. This creation of stakeholders is one reason for the or-
derly, but rapid, development of securities law in China,' exemplified
in the developing law of insider trading.78 The fragmentation of the
equities market through the use of five classes of shares helped to diver-
sify the stakeholders in the securities market.79 The classes of shares
created five distinct groups of stakeholders that are able to independent-
ly or collectively press their demands for an improvement of the securi-
ties system upon the Chinese government." Of these five groups of
stakeholders, the two groups that have had the largest impact on the
formulation of anti-fraud and insider-trading measures are the A-share
domestic investors and the B-share foreign investors.8
The existence of stakeholders in a well-run securities industry, howev-
er, may not inevitably lead to the conclusion that these same parties
have "stakes" in the imposition and enforcement of insider trading laws.
After all, there are numerous examples of developed economies with
weak prohibitions on insider trading, including Chinese societies such as
Hong Kong and Taiwan. 2 In spite of these experiences, the absence of
insider trading laws would hinder materially China's development.8 3 In
Dead, Analysts Say, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 12, 1993, at 9 (stating that analysts
prefer H-shares over B-shares because Chinese regulatory standards are less stringent
than international standards).
77. See Dede Nickerson, Zhou Puts Steady Hand on Securities Tiller, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Apr. 2, 1995, at 3 (noting the China Securities Regulatory
Commission's focus on securities legislation and enforcement enhancement).
78. Id.
79. Cf Qian, supra note 53, at 626 (stating that the five classifications of shares
does not create a consistent regulatory framework).
80. See Joseph Kahn, China Punishes Brokerage House in Crackdown on Insider
Trading, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1994, at All (discussing A-share investors'
frequent complaint of insider trading and exodus from the market).
81. The interests of the H- and N-share investors are also important, but are
largely governed by the regulations of the overseas exchanges their shares are listed
upon. See generally Qian, supra note 53, at 626-27 (discussing international standards
imposed on H- and N-shares for stock issuance and listings on major stock markets).
82. See Dow Jones Asian Equities Report, Apr. 30, 1996, at I (describing an
example of Hong Kong insider trading violation where the director for JLJ Securities
Limited misled investigators and withheld information).
83. See Tony Walker & Deidre Nickerson, International Capital Markets: China's
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order to attract foreign investment in China's markets, and to keep do-
mestic capital from fleeing to foreign exchanges in the future, the Chi-
nese government resorted to a capitalist model of public ownership and
safeguards like strict insider trading laws.' Hence, although insider
trading laws by themselves may not be necessary for economic develop-
ment, the internationalization of capital flows made them a necessary
condition for large-scale investment of non-captive capital.'
1. Small domestic investors
The most prominent group of new stakeholders created by the Chi-
nese securities regulations is the small Chinese investor who purchases
A-shares. s  As "millions of Chinese have become stockholders for the
first time,"' the profiles of the average Chinese investor and the aver-
age Chinese citizen have coalesced.' The market provided an invest-
ment option for the estimated three trillion yuan saved in the banks,P°
and the Chinese are eager to invest in it.9! '
Regulators Face an Unenviable Task, FIN. T1mES., Mar. 25, 1993, at 28 (warning that
China's unregulated stock market would have negative impact on the country's reform
and development).
84. See Tony Walker, Dragon With an Eye on its Futures: as China Opens Up
to the World, Shanghai's Financial Markets are Developing Fast - Perhaps Too Fast,
FIN. TmS, Apr. 2, 1994, at 10 (outlining the history of China's financial markets
and the development of insider trading laws).
85. See id. (recognizing the need for new securities laws to raise confidence and
to aid in recovering the equities market).
86. In the future, Chinese mutual funds and American(Eupean style pension
funds will develop and serve as a new group of domestic stakeholders. See Stock
Market, supra note 67, at 39 (discussing future development of investment funds). At
present, however, the owners of the largest (in the aggregate) domestic stakes are
small private shareholders. See Kahn, supra note 80, at All (stating that individual
speculators make up the majority of China's stock market participants).
87. Kahn, supra note 80, at All.
88. Joyce Bamathan et al., Is Prosperity Creating a Freer Society?, Bus. WK.,
June 6, 1994, at 102.
89. See Expansion of Securities Industry Outlined, XINMA, Nov. 25, 1995, re-
printed in FBIS DAILY REPORT--CHINA, Nov. 27, 1995, at 38, FBIS-ClI-95-227
(stating that ten million shareholders exist in the country).
90. See id (predicting an increase in share trading as deposits total three trillion
yuan).
91. See id (stating that by the end of 1995, Chinese citizens had invested 100
billion yuan in stocks). But see Teresa Poole, China Teeters Between 0 and Survival,
THE INDEPENDENT - LONDON, Aug. 8, 1994, at 21 (describing China's heavy trading
in A-shares as having more to do with government policy than small Chinese
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Unfortunately, the ability to invest may be dangerous when the aver-
age investor does not understand the mechanics of the market. Small,
individual investors constitute the majority of the 10 million investors in
the stock market,' and they "tend to trade based on rumors, as op-
posed to the outlook for stock dividends or long-term appreciation. '"93
In this environment, an effective regulatory mechanism to address the
problem of fraud is a necessity.9"
A major form of fraud which merits particular attention is insider
trading. The academic debate over whether insider trading is actually
harmful in an efficient market95 does not apply to the Chinese stock
market, because it is decidedly informationally inefficient.9 6 In an inef-
ficient market, insider trading is harmful because it allows insiders to
profit from the informational inefficiencies,7 and discourages insiders
from disclosing material information," which would lead to the devel-
opment of an informational mechanism99  to transmit the
information.1' As Chinese domestic institutional investors develop,'0 '
their influence should only add to the depth of the domestic
shareholder's stake in eradicating insider-trading.
investors' enthusiasm).
92. Kahn, supra note 80, at All.
93. Id. at Al1.
94. See id. (noting the difficulty of proving an incident of insider trading without
an effective policing unit).
95. See JOSEPH E. STIGLrrz, ECONOMICS 170-71 (1993) (discussing insider trading
and market efficiency).
96. See Barnathan et al., supra note 88, at 102 (observing that a journalist was
sentenced to twelve years in prison for writing about an interest rate increase).
97. In this scenario, under the semi-strong theory of market efficiency, investors
would trade on imperfect information, and the insider gain on the sale or purchase of
securities would be subsidized by a general 'informational inefficiency tax' unwittingly
paid by all investors trading on imperfect information. See STIGLrrz, supra note 95, at
169-71 (defining theories of market efficiency); Kahn, supra note 80, at All (discuss-
ing the tendency of stock market participants to trade based on rumors).
98. Todd Carrel, Chinese Have No Real Incentive to Change, NEWSDAY, Sept.7,
1994, at A31.
99. Though it is too early to tell, there are some signs that the Chinese media
may assume the role of an independent watchdog in the securities market. See
Bamathan et al., supra note 88, at 102 (discussing the newborn investigative journal-
ism of the Chinese business press).
100. Id.
101. See Kahn, supra note 80, at All (discussing China's plan to encourage the
increased use of institutional investors).
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The interesting effect of the creation of a large body of small inves-
tors is that one coordinated or many simultaneous and independent ex-
pressions of dissatisfaction with the administration of the system may be
enough to reverse the conventional balance of power between the high-
level party cadres and other insiders, and the small individual investors.
Generally, the "insiders" wield enough power to keep the disorganized,
unhappy investors out of the picture.' ° As China becomes a "nation
of small investors,"'" however, the probability of widespread dissatis-
faction with an inequitable situation or a scandal increases. The govern-
ment has not generally tolerated public expressions of dissatisfaction or
anger,' °4 and it is the fear of luan ("chaotic situations") that allows the
vast body of small shareholders to have an impact on national policies.
A concerted government effort to prevent information sharing among
investors is certainly possible, and would do much to prevent unrest, but
would also harm the capital markets substantially.
2. Foreign Investors
The second major group of stakeholders created by the new securities
regime is the collection of foreign investors supplying capital for the
Chinese markets through investments in B-, H-, or N-shares.es Much
of the pressure for legal reform and enforcement in the securities indus-
try comes from foreign lawyers and multinational lenders.'o Major
American institutional investors hope that reforms begun by China Secu-
rities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) will help eliminate much of the
insider trading 7 by providing sufficient sanctions for fraudulent activ-
ities in the securities markets.
In the view of this group of stakeholders, insider trading is problemat-
ic because it allows domestic insiders to profit at the expense of foreign
102. Carrell, supra note 98, at A31.
103. See Ian Williams, Straits the Gate, ImVESTOR REL, Mar. 1, 1996, at 52 (stat-
ing that 80 percent of the Chinese stock market consists of small investors).
104. See Poole, supra note 91 (describing the Shenzhen riots by citizens angry
about the method for deciding A-share subscribers).
105. This article focuses on the B-share investors, because the H- and N-share
investors are subject to, and protected by, the rules of trading exchanges. See general-
ly Qian, supra note 53, at 626-27 (discussing international standards imposed on H-
and N-shares for stock issuance and listings on major stock markets).
106. Walker & Nickerson, supra note 83, at 28 (noting the insistence of foreign lawyers
and leaders for the enforcement of securities law and regulations in thde stock market).
107. ChinaiPrud&niallShanghai -2: Expects Reforms Will Help, Dow Jo -S INT'L NEWs
SERV., May 4, 1995, available in WESTLAW, DJINS Database.
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capital investors. Insider trading is, in effect, an indirect funneling of
capital into the pockets of Chinese insiders. 0 8 The foreign investors
play an important role in the market because of their influence on pric-
es. Much of the downturn in the A- and B-share markets'o° has been
attributed to investor disenchantment of a system with pervasive insider
trading.Y° When the B-share market is threatened, foreign and domes-
tic investors will exert pressure for the rectification of the situation. The
pressure of this large group of stakeholders should serve as a constant
prod for the government to take action.
3. The Government
The third major stakeholder of the new securities environment is the
government itself.1"' The government holds a number of stakes in the
securities market." 2 It is the regulator, a market participant, and the
recipient of all shareholder dissatisfaction with the management of the
exchanges.' The government's self-interest becomes quite powerful in
the examination of insider trading laws.' 
4
If China follows the Taiwanese model, which seems likely, then it
will remain "a nation of small investors.""' In nations of small inves-
108. This assertion assumes a link between the fluctuations of B- and A-share
prices. In this situation, increased foreign investment would drive up the prices of B-
shares. Through the implied link with the A-share market, the prices of A-shares in
these companies will also rise. If an insider holds non-public information which indi-
cates that the stocks are overvalued, the foreign investment increases the profits made
when the insider sells the shares for more than their true value.
109. The A-share market fell by 50 percent and the B-share market experienced
real volatility and an extended decline. Walker, supra note 84, at 10.
110. Hong Kong Status 'Won't Fade': Memorandum of Cooperation Signed, VAN-
COUVER SUN, July 5, 1995, at D4; Kahn, supra note 80, at All; see Walker, supra
note 84, at 10 (noting the equity market's depression and the desertion of local inves-
tors for futures and currencies). Ironically, it was a slump in the market that caused
some brokers to turn to insider trading in an effort to find those few issues that
would result in a healthy return. Christine Chan, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 28,
1994, at 1, available in WESTLAW, Chinapost Database. This effort, however, ulti-
mately only added another reason for the slump to continue. Id.
11l. See Walker, supra note 84, at 10 (naming China's state trading corporations
as one of the biggest players in the Chinese commodities exchanges).
112. See Barnathan et al., supra note 88, at 102 (noting the profit the government
is making from its businesses).
113. Id.
114. See Walker & Nickerson, supra note 83, at 28 (discussing Chinese self-regu-
lation).
115. Democracy's Downside: Taiwan, ECONOIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 37. See Wil-
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tors, governments rise and fall based on the performance of the mar-
ket,116 because the average citizen's stake in the market is large (at
least as a percentage of personal assets), and market regulation becomes
a high priority. This 'proletariatization' of the market will have a pro-
found impact on the government 17 as the average investor-citizen
pressures the government to regulate the market, protect domestic inves-
tors, and prevent or punish malfeasance.1 8
The government should not take these responsibilities lightly, because
there is a high price to pay for market instability. One important aim of
the Chinese "opening up" policy was to ensure that rights under the
new system were not inequitably distributed," 9 but the 1993 Shenzhen
riots were an example to the contrary.' ° The 1993 riots resulted from
frustrated would-be investors in the market, angered when they discov-
ered that insiders snapped up the majority of shares in a public offering
before trading offices opened.12' Also, the government may not now
refuse its regulatory duty. Citizens have accepted the stock market and
have staked a claim on its proper operation.' " To refuse to accept this
duty would be to ignore the "groundswell among China's citizens to
demand accountability from their government."' It might also foster a
disrespect for law and order, and further encourage an entire generation
to earn profit through any means possible.2 Thus, because the elim-
ination of insider trading fosters domestic tranquillity, the government
has a strong, visible stake in combating insider trading.
Hams, supra note 103, at 52 (stating that 80 percent of the stock market consists of
small investors).
116. Democracy's Downside: Taiwan, supra note 115, at 37.
117. See Barnathan et al., supra note 88, at 102 (noting that an economic boom
caused a political revolution); contra Carrel, supra note 98, at A31 (stating that the
Chinese government is aloof to the demands of its citizens).
118. See Barnathan et al., supra note 88, at 94 (discussing the differing ways
Chinese citizens are demanding justice).
119. Ni Pin, Zhongguo Gaige de Xiayibu-Shinian Jingyan de Qidi, (The Next
Step of Chinese Economic Reform], in ZHONGGUO JINGIR GAIGE: FENxI, FANSHENG,
QIANZHAN [CHINA'S ECONOMIC REFORM: ANALYSIS, RER.EcrlioNS, AND PROSPECrs]
93, 96 (Xu Dianqing et al. eds., 1991).
120. See Poole, supra note 91 (describing the riots by investors angry about cor-
ruption in allocating shares).
121. Solomon M. Karmel, Emerging Securities Markets in China: Capitalism with
Chinese Characteristics, CHINA Q., 1105, 1119 (1994).
122. Id.
123. Carrel, supra note 98, at A31.
124. Id.
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Moreover, the government is under pressure to respond to the de-
mands of foreign investors.'" While the government may ignore the
demands of the foreign capitalists, it cannot ignore the domestic enter-
prises that would suffer from the lack of foreign investment in the Chi-
nese B-share market.'" Ignoring problems such as insider trading
would, according to a 'government leader' in China, "impose an increas-
ingly negative impact on the country's economic reform 27 Commenta-
tors note that the "reaping of staggering profits" presents a serious threat
to the construction of a stable securities market,'8 and the president of
the Shanghai Securities Exchange, Wei Wenyuan, called insider trading
one of the exchange's "[miost important problems.' 29
The Chinese government, however, does not appear to be ignorant of
the problems in the market,130 but it is, rather, "alarmed"'' at the
possibility of a market failure. 132 The recent appointment of Zhou
Daojiong as acting chairman of the CSRC demonstrates the central gov-
ernment's desire for financial stability.133 The appointment represents
an imposition of discipline by the government upon the financial mar-
kets following a recent scandal in the futures market. 34
125. See Walker & Nickerson, supra note 83, at 28 (listing foreign lawyers,
bankers, and institutions as investors urging Chinese economic reforms).
126. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting the importance of B-shares
in absorbing foreign capital through the stock market).
127. Walker & Nickerson, supra note 83, at 28.
128. Zhao Zhengbing et al., Shilun Woguo Zhengquan Neimu Jiaoyi Falu Yueshu
Jizhi jiqi Wanshan [An Examination of China's Insider Trading Legal Restraints and
Their Improvement], 72:4 FAXUE PINGLUN [LEGAL ANALYSIS] 17, 17 (1995).
129. Kahn, supra note 80, at All.
130. See Walker & Nickerson, supra note 83, at 28 (noting the economic charac-
terization of Shenzhen and Shanghai by a member of the leadership as extremely
risky).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Nickerson, supra note 77, at 3. Mr. Zhou's appointment has not been universally ac-
claimed. One former CSRC employee expressed his disappointment: "The central authorities
don't want experimentation, they don't want new products, they only want stability and that's
what they'll get from Mr. Zhou, who prides himself on knowing little about the industry.
Hopefully they will not choke the market to death...." Id.
134. The scandal involved a dramatic imbalance between long and short positions
in the government debt futures market, a situation which was the result of companies
flouting the Shanghai Exchange's rules. See Foo Choy Peng, Merger Set to Give
Birth to Colossal Brokerage, S. CERNA MORNING POST, Feb. 15, 1996, at I (noting
the brokerage's ban from underwriting for its role in a treasury bond futures scandal);
see also Leadership of Securities Firm Reshuffled, XINHuA NEws AGENCY, Apr. 27,
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The government also has reason for concern about the performance of
the stock market because as a direct market participant, a downturn in
the market would be harmful to it. The government holds from fifty-one
to eighty percent of most companies listed on the Chinese ex-
changes,135 and therefore a market downturn has a direct effect on the
government's fiscal viability. This may well be the most powerful rea-
son for vigorous enforcement of measures that ensure market stability
and profitability.
Government officials' frequent engagement in insider trading forms
the third aspect of the government's stake. 35 In order for the govern-
ment to obtain the public's confidence that it can act as an 'honest
broker' and enforcer of the securities laws, it must have its own house
in order.' 37 Hence, the government has a vested interest in the impar-
tial and effective enforcement of laws such as the insider trading regula-
tions.
An interesting question arises after examining the treatment of govern-
ment employees who commit insider trading. How will the government,
acting as a shareholder and a market participant, be able to trade with-
out violating insider trading rules or without angering the broad base of
shareholders? No one has yet addressed this question, although it will
likely pose a problem in the distant future if government shares become
marketable.
m. THE CREATION OF A SECURITIES REGULATORY REGIME
The diversification of stakeholders in the insider trading laws helped
spur the development of a securities regulatory mechanism, and is likely
to ensure vigorous and effective enforcement of its provisions in the fu-
ture. 3 1 While this effort began as a confused set of overlapping ef-
1995, available in WVestlaw, Allnews Database, 1995 WVL 7711964. Blame has been
affixed to Guan Jinsheng, of Shanghai International Securities Company (commonly
known as Wanguo), and he has been sentenced to a 16-year prison term for "disrupt-
ing the financial order." Id.
135. Matthew D. Bersani, Privatization and the Creation of Stock Companies in
China, COLum. Bus. L. REV. 301, 306 (1993).
136. See infra notes 229-35 and accompanying text (discussing de facto insiders-
insiders whose status derives from their official positions - and measures taken to
curb the problem).
137. See id. (discussing the de facto insider trading regulations).
138. See Qian, supra note 53, at 625-28 (discussing the securities regulatory re-
gime).
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forts, "'39 the trend became one of rationalization of the regulations' 4"
and an increase in the power, sophistication, and resources of the regula-
tors who will enforce them.
141
From the beginning, a regulatory confusion characterized the securities
markets. 142 Over a dozen different government bodies share the task of
supervising different aspects of the market." The People's Bank of
China (PBOC) and the Commission of Economic System Reform were
originally the nominal, official government regulators,'"4 but local gov-
ernments supplemented (or hampered) the national regulatory efforts, 45
especially the governments of Shanghai and Shenzhen" which have
their own municipal securities regulatory commissions,4 7 and a num-
ber of administrative organs,' 48 (including the CSRC, the National As-
set Control Bureau, the Finance Ministry, the Taxation bureau, the struc-
tural reform commission, and the economics and trade commission)
139. See Christine Chan, Duties on Mainland Ill-Defined Clear Up Role of Watch-
dog, Say Brokers, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Apr. 27, 1994, at 1, available in
WESTLAW, SCHMP Database, 1994 WL 9339407 (quoting a Chinese official as
saying there is an "overlap of pavers" and it is not always clear "which authorities
are responsible for what.").
140. Cf. Pete Engardio & Joyce Barnathan, Take A Nap. Read A Book. It's The
Shanghai Bourse: Half-Baked Reforms Are Stalling China's Markets And Economy,
Bus. WK., May 1, 1995, at 56 (stating that while China is moving toward a national
securities law, it still has "dragged its feet.").
141. See Qian, supra note 53, at 627 (discussing China's need for securities law-
yers, judges, and government regulators because China's securities laws and regula-
tions are increasing in volume and the securities transactions growing more sophisti-
cated).
142. See China Securities Watchdog Urges Uniformity, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, May
8, 1994, at *2, available in WESTLAW, AFP-ENG Database, 1994 WL 9613902
[hereinafter Securities Watchdog] (stating that some companies were unaware of regu-
latory requirements and were confused without the clear definition of their rights and
responsibilities).
143. Engardio & Bamathan, supra note 140, at 56.
144. YI, supra note 37, at 257.
145. Id.
146. Engardio & Barnathan, supra note 140, at 56.
147. See China Issues Market Warning, WAL ST. 1. (Europe), May 30, 1994, at 7 (dis-
cussing Shanghai's regulatory commission); Shenzhen Sets Up Stock Market Watchdog,
AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Mar. 23, 1993, available in WESTLAW, AGFRP Database, 1993 WL
10702479 (discussing Shenzhen's regulatory commission).
148. ZHONGGUO SHICHANG FAZHAN BAOGAO [CHINA MARKET DEV. REP.J 116
(Sun Shangqing et al. eds., 1995) (stating that the administrative organs include the
CSRC, the National Asset Control Bureau, the Finance Ministry, the Taxation bureau,
the Structural Reform Commission, and the Economics and Trade Commission).
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which issues a variety of forms of regulations (including guiding [rules],
banfa [methods], tongzhi [notices], and jueding [decisions]). 9
In spite of the cacophony of regulators, the State Council holds the
real regulatory power in the securities industry.'50 The State Council
and its subordinate institutions,' the Securities Commission
(Guowuyuan Zhengquan Weiyuanhui) and the CSRC (Zhongguo
Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui),' which is the Chinese coun-
terpart of the Securities and Exchange Commission," were both es-
tablished in 1993 254 They issue most of the relevant regulations for
the securities industry, 15  influence the drafting of national legislation
for the securities field,'5 6 regulate all but the most local of securities
149. Il
150. Yt, supra note 37, at 258.
151. From a functional perspective, the CSRC should be subordinate to the State
Council, if the alternatives are subordination to the Judiciary (Sifa Bu), the legislature,
the Ministry of Finance, or the Party. In fact, this may be a more conceptually ap-
pealing model than the American "headless fourth branch" approach to regulatory
bodies. See John M. Hawthorne, DEP's Title S Defense Based on Faulty Assumptions,
24 MASS. L. WKLY. 11 (1996) (calling the "tyranny of unelected bureaucrats" of fed-
eral regulatory agencies the "headless fourth branch"). If China's legal and institution-
al development continues to follow a "separation of powers" model, it makes sense
that the regulatory body be part of the executive branch. Cf. Bing Song, supra note
7, at 388 (discussing China as an economy in transition that is not yet able to break-
up public monopolies). With the State Council as the head of the administrative
branch, it is easier to coordinate the development and enforcement of regulations with
the enforcement of laws. Id. at 407 n.111 (stating that administrative companies are
often headed by incumbent party or government officials and controlled by the State
Council).
152. Stock Management, BEIJING WEEKEND, Nov. 6, 1992, available in
WESTLA\V, Beiwe Database, 1992 WL 8420969; YI, supra note 37, at 258.
153. See Qian, supra note 53, at 625 (stating that China borrowed from western
models, including U.S. securities laws, when it developed its securities regulatory sys-
tem); id. at 627 n.58 (stating that the SEC and the CSRC signed a memorandum of
cooperation and reconciliation in early 1994).
154. Securities Watchdog, supra note 142, at *2.
155. See Qian, supra note 53, at 626 n.54 (discussing the regulations promulgated
by the State Council and the CSRC); Tarbutton, supra note 37, at 420 (stating that
the Securities Commission and the CSRC were responsible for formation of nation-
wide regulatory policy).
156. See Securities Watchdog, supra note 142, at *1 (discussing the need for com-
panies to standardize their operations and to strictly adhere to new government laws
and regulations governing the securities market); Chan, supra note 139, at I (discuss-
ing the joint orders of regulators and police calling for more professionalism and an
end to fraud in the stock market).
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activity,' 5 and refer cases to the Supreme People's Procurator for in-
vestigation and criminal prosecution.' The CSRC performs all of the
supervisory, regulatory, and enforcement functions,'59 guided by the
more abstract directives of the Securities Commission," which has
overall responsibility for administering the national securities market.' 6'
While terming the CSRC as the "real regulatory power"'62 would be
overstating its effective authority, the opposite view, that of a self-admit-
ted "tiger without teeth,"'" may be equally as incorrect. A more apt
comparison might be to a teething cub that can only take tiny bites.'6
The cub is also growing quickly; in 1994 alone, there were 110 resig-
nations or discharges of directors, chairpersons, and presidents of 56
publicly traded companies following charges of corruption and incompe-
tence.
65
157. Cf. Qian, supra note 53, at 626-27 (discussing the more detailed and specific
local rules that have limited jurisdiction).
158. Christine Chan et al., Business News, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 28,
1994, at 1, available in WESTLAW, Chinapost Database.
159. See Yi, supra note 37, at 257 (describing the CSRC as "coordinating" and
"regulating" the securities market); see also Securities Watchdog, supra note 142, at
*1 (referring to the CSRC as China's "top Securities Watchdog.").
160. Stock Management, supra note 152 (stating that the Securities Commission
will "guide and supervise" the CSRC in "setting day-to-day policy for securities trad-
ing"); Tarbutton, supra note 37, at 420 n.73 (stating the Securities Commission was
created to shape policies for new securities regulations that the CSRC executes).
161. Pitman Potter, P.R.C. State Council Issues National Stock Regulations, E.
ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., July 15, 1993, at 9, 9; Stock Management, supra note 152.
There is some hope that an effective industry self-regulatory body will develop to supple-
ment the CSRC. The China Financial Security Association (Zhongguo Zhengquanye
Xiehui) was established in 1991 with the express hope of becoming such a self-regulator,
but its development has been slow. Yi, supra note 37, at 257.
162. See text accompanying note 152 ((correctly) naming the State Council the
"real regulatory power").
163. Engardio & Bamathan, supra note 140, at 56; see Joseph Kahn, Beijing
Holds the Cards, AsIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1994, at S3 (stating that "Authorities
say they believe insider trading and market manipulation are rampant, but that they
don't have the means to crack down.").
164. See Securities Watchdog, supra note 142, at *2 (reporting the comments of
Liu Hongru, then-chairman of the CSRC, who noted that although the CSRC had
grown quickly and had a notable impact on illegal practices, "many problems persist-
ed").
165. On the Record: International, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 7, 1995, at B5. Yet
in the classic rock-and-a-hard-place scenario, these changes of personnel only fueled
vocal fears of instability in the market from the same investors who complain about
corruption and insider trading. Id.
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The CSRC's station in the authoritative hierarchy is validated in prac-
tice. Zhang Zhiping, a director at the CSRC's Securities Institution De-
partment, described a four-tier system commonly used to reduce con-
flict:" "The first [tier] is the two national stock exchanges which
have control over the discipline of their respective members. The second
is the CSRC, the third [is the several] domestic regulatory bodies and
the fourth the courts if violations are deemed to be criminal."'16 The
CSRC is the primary regulatory force in the market because it imple-
ments the initiatives of the Securities Commission, which is the major
"domestic regulatory [body]. ' ' "es It is also clear that the strength of the
CSRC is directly related to the absence of insider trading (and other
forms of fraud) in the Chinese securities markets."¢
IV. INSIDER TRADING
A. THE POPULAR VIEW
One criticism of the many efforts by American investors to encourage
other countries to change their domestic laws or practices is the asser-
tion that American (or any nation's) investors have no right to impose
foreign morals upon another culture, especially when the efficiency of
insider trading prohibitions has been questioned in several western
nations."' While the counter-argument that customers have the right to
dictate the terms upon which they will invest their capital has merit,"
166. Chan, supra note 139, at 1.
167. Id.
168. See supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Securities
Commission and the CSRC).
169. See Chan et al., supra note 158, at 1 (discussing the joint order by the
CSRC and police calling for more thorough control of information, promotion of bet-
ter understanding of stock investment among the public, and a complete ban on unau-
thorized information, illegal stock publications and fraud).
170. See Marleen O'Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider
Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309, 314 (1989) (dis-
cussing the lack of definitive and reliable data regarding social harm caused by insid-
er trading); Dennis NV. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trad-
ing, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 866-68 (1983) (discussing the positive aspects of insider
trading). But see Barry A.X. Rider, Global Trends In Securities Regulation: The Changing
Legal Climate, 13 DIcK. J. INT'L L 513 (1995) (discussing international cooperation as a
means to conquer the universal problem of insider trading and restore faith in the market).
171. See Investors See Red Over Grey Shares, S. CHINA MORNING POST. Apr. 23,
1995, at 8 (questioning whether only the favored few with access to insider informa-
tion should benefit at the expense of those who do not have access to such informa-
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it is unnecessary to discuss it here because the Chinese government and
the public agree that insider trading is contrary to the basic principles of
equity which govern the markets.' m
The Chinese securities markets are governed, in principle, by the
"three gongs:" gongping [equity], gongzheng [fairness], and gongkai
[openness]. 173 Anecdotal evidence indicates that Chinese investors them-
selves see insider trading as contrary to at least one of the three
gongs. 74
There is even a special term for stock speculation, including stocks
traded by insiders: "stir-fried shares (chaogu)."'75 A chaogu can result
from the "use of inside information to the advantage of the insiders and
the detriment of medium and small-sized investors, and affects fair and
efficient trading (lianzhuan) in the market."'76 The negative connota-
tion of the term reflects the general opinion that insider trading is in-
deed wrong and should be prevented or punished. The official attitude is
similar, as reflected in a recent China Daily article:
Some people think that the market price is a result of balance between
supply and demand and should be accepted rather than interrupted. They
say the high profit some investors make is their reward for the risks they
face in the stock market. When the market is manipulated by a few large
investors, certain kinds of monopolies will be formed, and market prices
may become far from reasonable. 7 8
The general condemnation of market manipulation applies to insider
trading as well as all other manifestations of fraud in the market. 79 A
tion); see also Qian, supra note 53, at 626-27 (discussing the necessity of maintaining
fairness and objectivity by full disclosure and other shareholder protections).
172. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing attitudes about illegal
trade activities).
173. Zhao Zhengbing et al., supra note 128, at 17.
174. See Investors see Red over Grey Shares, supra note 171, at 8 (stating that
"Chinese investors are angry enough over rife insider trading and want a level play-
ing field.").
175. Luo YUNFAN, SHANGHAI-SHENZHEN GUPIAo FENXl YU CAOZUO [THE
SHANGHAI-SHENZHEN STOCK MARKETS: ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONS] 219 (1993).
176. Id. Western observers seem to accept the Chinese fears that insider trading
will harm small investors. See Walker, supra note 84, at 10 ("Insider trading is a
persistent problem . . . . This poses a threat to individual and smaller institutional in-
vestors who are in danger of being squeezed.")
177. An Lu, To The Point: No Prohibition, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 6, 1995, at 41.
178. Id.
179. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing the ban on fraudulent
trading activity).
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consensus between the general attitude and the official position that
insider trading is wrong or inequitable satisfies the primary condition for
the enforcement of insider trading prohibitions."r This condition is im-
portant to the development of a stakeholder jurisprudence,'8' which
builds upon the shared values of a legal system's citizens and other
constituents, such as the government.' 2
B. INSIDER TRADING LAW
Given that we can conclude that insider trading is "wrong" in China,
the next question is: Is insider trading illegal? Determining what is ille-
gal in China can be a tricky exercise because China still does not have
a national securities law, though one has been promised for several
years." In the absence of a securities law, the legal hierarchy looks
to the many varieties of regulations, and insider trading certainly violates
the regulations, if not the law.'" Violation of the regulations in China
carries penalties such as fines and, in some cases, incarceration; there-
fore, a distinction between the violation of a regulation and a law may
not be meaningful.
One of the earliest pieces of national securities legislation to address
insider trading,s the 1990 Zhengquan Gongsi Guanli Zanxing Banfa
[Temporary Measures Controlling Securities Firms], stated clearly that
"securities firms must not engage in price-fixing, insider trading, fraud,
or other trading or behavior which influences the quoted market prices
in order to reap undeserved profits."'" The local regulations governing
the Shenzhen and Shanghai exchanges implemented this prohibition
against insider trading and fraud. the Shenzhen Municipality Stock Issu-
180. See supra notes 169-71, 174, 176 and accompanying text (discussing official
and public attitudes about insider trading).
181. Cf. Unhappy Families: Stakeholder Capitalism, supra note 14, at 23 (discuss-
ing the stakeholder capitalism found in Japan, which mandates that companies behave
with greater social responsibility to all stakeholders in society and not just to share-
holders).
182. Id.; see supra notes 14-25 and accompanying teXL
183. Chinese Securities Law To Be Announced Soon: Report. AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Aug.
22, 1993, available in WESTLAWV, AFP-Eng Database, 1993 \VL 10760267.
184. See Qian, supra note 53, at 626 (stating that Chinese secuities law at the
national level only consists of rules and regulations, which has impeded fast develop-
ment of the Chinese securities industry).
185. Zhao Zhengbing et al., supra note 128. at 17.
186. Zhengquan Gongsi Guanli Zanxing Banfa [Temporary Measures Controlling
Securities Firms], art. 17 (October 1990) (emphasis added).
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ance and Trading Control Measures (Shenzhen Measures),'87 and the
Shanghai Municipality Securities Trading Control Measures (Shanghai
Measures).'
The current national law on insider trading is provisional, consisting
of a pair of 1993 regulations:8 9 the Temporary Regulations for the
Oversight of Stock Issuance and Trading (Temporary Regulations),' 9"
and the Temporary Measures Forbidding Fraudulent Behavior (Tempo-
rary Measures).' 9' Until the promised securities law is promulgated in
the next two to three years, the current regulations will continue to
govern insider trading. In any event, the insider trading provisions of the
law should not materially differ from the insider trading regulations,
because they were all part of the same drafting effort."9
1. The Definition of Insider Trading
The Chinese literature generally distinguishes between two main types
of insider trading:93 the use of inside information by an insider for
self enrichment,'94 and the leaking of information by an insider to a
187. Shenzhenshi Gupiao Faxing yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Banfa (Shenzhen Mu-
nicipality Stock Issuance and Trading Control Measures) art. 43(4), reprinted in LUO
YUNFAN, supra note 175, at 247 [hereinafter Shenzhen Measures] (listing insider trad-
ing as an activity prohibited in stock trading).
188. Shanghaishi Zhengquan Jiaoyi Guanli Banfa [The Shanghai Municipality Se-
curities Trading Control Measures] art. 39(2), reprinted in Luo YUNFAN, supra note
175, at 225 [hereinafter Shanghai Measures] (prohibiting the use of inside information
to trade stocks).
189. Chan, supra note 139, at 1.
190. Gupiao Faxing yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli [Temporary Regulations for
the Oversight of Stock Issuance and Trading], Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Zhengquan Fagui Huibian 1-9 [hereinafter Temporary Regulations]. The State Council
promulgated the Temporary Regulations. Id.
191. Jinzhi Zhengquan Qizha Xingwei Zanxing Banfa [Temporary Measures Forbid-
ding Fraudulent Behavior] Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fagui Huibian 2-
147 [hereinafter Temporary Measures]. The State Council approved and the State Cou-
ncil Securities Committee (Guowuyuan Zhengquan Weiyuanhui) issued the Temporary
Measures. Id.
192. Id.
193. Zhao Zhengbing et al., supra note 128, at 17.
194. Id.
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third person, causing the third person to engage in illegal trade practic-
es.195 The insider trading regulations cover both in detail.196
The most specific definition of "insider trading" comes from the
Temporary Measures, which define insider trading as follows:'9
(1) an insider trading on inside information or suggesting to a third
person that he buy or sell certain securities;'53
(2) an insider leaking inside information to a third person, enabling
that person to use the information to engage in insider trad-
ing,199
(3) a non-insider, through improper means or other channels, obtain-
ing inside information and trading on the basis of that informa-
tion, or encouraging another person to trade;20
(4) other insider trading behavior'
"Other insider trading behavior" includes:'
[A] work unit or an individual, with the purpose of earning profits or
mitigating losses, [using] its capital, information, or superior position, or
abuses the powers or authority of its office to manipulate the market, to
influence stock prices, to foster a false perception of the condition of the
market, to cause investors who do not understand the real situation to
decide to make a securities investment, [or] to disrupt the order of the
securities market....2o
The Shenzhen Measures set forth a simpler definition of insider trad-
ing.' They define it as "the use of inside information" when "en-
gaged in securities trading." This definition includes trading in a
company's stock, warrants, or other marketable securities by its direc-
tors.? Like Shenzhen, the Shanghai Measures also prohibit insider
trading, although the definition of insider trading in the Shanghai
195. See id. (allowing a third person to gain inside
purposes).
196. Id.
197. Temporary Measures, supra note 191, art. 4.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Temporary Measures, supra note 191, art. 7.
203. Id.
204. Shenzhen Measures, supra note 187, art. 43(4).
205. Id.
206. Id. arts. 41, 43(4).
207. Shanghai Measures, supra note 188, arts. 39(1), C
information for illegitimate
2), (6).
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Measures is less elaborate. They state simply that "in securities trading,
it is forbidden for any unit or individual to ... use inside information
to engage in the purchase or sale of securities [or to,] . . . through other
direct or indirect means, manipulate the market or disrupt the orderliness
of the market." ' 8
It is also worth noting that in China, as in the United States,2°9
"short swing profit (duanxian jiaoyi)" constitutes insider trading.210 In
China, an "incorporated company's directors, supervisors, officers, or
shareholders with over five percent of the voting shares who sell shares
bought within the last six months, or who buy shares sold within the
last six months, must remit to the company the profit gained on the
transaction."' One should note that this is a strict liability sys-
tem. 12 Hence, a purchase and a sale within six months are automati-
cally deemed as insider trading.21 As a Chinese article notes, howev-
er, this system may serve only to "postpone insider trading,"214 al-
though it does present a barrier to some types of insider trading on the
presumption that inside information has a short useful life. 15
2. The Definition of "Insider"
One Chinese securities dictionary defines "insider" as "directors, ad-
ministrative personnel and other managers or professionals [lawyers,
accountants, and so forth] who may, through the performance of their
duties, encounter inside information."2 6 The technical definition, found
in the Temporary Measures, elaborates on and expands the dictionary
208. Id.
209. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (1995) (pro-
hibiting profits from the purchase and sale of a security within six months by an
insider).
210. Temporary Regulations, supra note 190, art. 38.
211. Id.
212. See Zhao Zhengbing et al., supra note 128, at 20 (stating that article 38 of
the Temporary Regulations applies regardless of whether or not the inside information
was used and whether it was an act of good intentions).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. ZHENGQUAN CIDIAN, [SECURITIEs DICTIONARY] 282 (Yan ie et al. eds., 19-
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definition.21 The Temporary Measures define "insiders" as fol-
lows:
218
1. directors, supervisors, officers, secretaries, typists, and other personnel
of the issuer who come into contact with or obtain insider information
through the performance of their duties; 219
2. lawyers, accountants, capital asset appraisers, investment consultants,
regulators of securities institutions, market participants, and others who
because of the performance of their duties encounter or obtain inside
information;'
3. an individual who, on the basis of laws or regulations has control or
supervisory rights over an issuer, including the employees of securities
regulators and exchanges, employees of the issuer, and the employees of
any examiners or auditors ... ; 21
4. an individual who, on the basis of his occupation, or who, by means
of a contractual or employment relationship with the issuer, may encoun-
ter or obtain insider trading, including news reporters, magazine editors,
television directors and printers;
5. other employees who may through lawful channels encounter inside
information.m
The local exchange regulations similarly define an "insider."' 4 The
Shenzhen Measures define insiders as "a listed company's directors,
supervisors, managers, and officers." During their terms of office,
these insiders cannot transfer title or possession of their company's
stock, warrants, or other marketable securities.6 The Shanghai Mea-
sures are broader tm and also include in the definition of "insider" an
addition to the standard insider categories listed above: "employees of
institutions related to or directly subordinate to the issuer and other
217. See Temporary Measures, supra note 191, art. 6 (defining insiders by five
groups).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Compare Shenzhen Measures, supra note 187, art. 41 with Shanghai Meas-
ures, supra note 188, art. 40(l)-(5) (defining insider).
225. Shenzhen Measures, supra note 187, art. 41.
226. Id.
227. See Shanghai Measures, supra note 188, art. 40(1)-(5) (expanding the defini-
tion of insiders to include not just issuers and their employees, but anyone who may
come in contact with the trading process).
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insiders with ties to issuers or traders." As in Shenzhen, the Shang-
hai Measures prohibit insiders from either directly or indirectly buying
or selling stock for their own account. 9
The second type of insider derives his or her insider status from his
or her official position. This de facto insider is a government employee
who comes into contact with inside information through the performance
of his or her official duties.' ° Improper trading by these de facto in-
siders has been a recurrent problem in the Chinese markets,13 1 as well
as in Hong Kong, where Chinese officials often trade shares listed on
the Hong Kong exchange, 23' which rises and falls largely based on the
British-Chinese relationship. 23 To combat de facto insider trading in
China, the Temporary Regulations provide that "securities industry regu-
lators, administrators, and other actors are prohibited from trading by the
government, cannot directly or indirectly hold or trade shares, excluding
the buying or selling of securities in approved investment fund. 'z 4
The local Shenzhen Measures also prohibit de facto insider trading by
forbidding "party cadres, active duty military personnel, personnel en-
gaged in the securities industry, and employees of government agencies
whose work necessitates involvement in the securities industry"'2 from
buying or selling stock. 6
Because the regulators of the securities markets often lack control
over the acts of government officials,2 7 additional measures to curb de
228. See id. art. 40(4)-(5) (detailing prohibitions against insiders who are directly
or indirectly connected with the trading process from engaging in the securities trade).
229. Id. art. 40.
230. See China's Difficult Dilemma: Subduing Serious Corruption of Government
Officials & Other Politically Connected Individuals (II), KOREA ECON. DAILY, Mar.
27, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database, 1995 WL 9697981 (noting the
increase in insider trading by Chinese government officials since 1989).
231. See id. (discussing insider trading in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets).
232. Yojana Sharma, Hong Kong: Insider Knowledge Lets Chinese Ride Out Stocks
Storm? INTER PREss SERVICE, Apr. 5, 1993, available in WESTLAW, Alinews Database,
1993 WL 2541999 (discussing the use by Chinese officials of "insider knowledge of Beijing's
tirades against Hong Kong governor Chris Patten.").
233. Id.
234. Temporary Regulations, supra note 190, art. 39.
235. Shenzhen Measures, supra note 187, art. 29, 3.
236. Id. The Shenzhen Measures continue to state that, with respect to these de
facto insiders, specific administrative measures will be separately formulated by the
appropriate government bureaus and presented to the People's Bank of China and
municipal government for approval. Id.
237. Cf. Sharma, supra note 232 (noting the huge profits government officials are
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facto insider trading are needed and have already begun to be
implemented.1 8 In 1993, for example, the Communist Party's top dis-
ciplinary committee barred party officials from engaging in stock market
transactions. 9 Whether a serious attempt to impose internal party dis-
cipline will materialize and ultimately prove successful is uncertain, but,
as discussed below, party edicts have not yet solved the de facto insider
trading problem. °
3. The Definition of Inside Information
The careful efforts made in defining "insider" are surprisingly sparse
when defining "inside information," as shown by the only one available,
but rather cursory, definition of "inside information." The Temporary
Measures define inside information as information which is "not yet
public and capable of influencing the listed price of a security. 24' The
Temporary Measures include twenty-six specific categories of potential
inside information, which include, inter alia, events such as the signing
of an important contract by the issuer, the changing of the issuer's man-
agement policies, large investments or expenditures by the issuer, the
shouldering of large debts, non-public difficulties for the repayment of
debts, and non-public knowledge of operating losses! 42
The implications of such a broad definition of insider trading are
clear. Apparently, the State Council intended to grant the regulators a
considerable degree of discretion in prosecuting insider trading cases
through the choice of such broad definitions. 243 Whether the delegation
of broad discretion will ultimately prove to be a wise policy is a ques-
tion to be answered in the distant future, but it appears to be a natural
reaction to the many calls for action on insider trading.
making in the stock market and the irregularities their participation is causing).
238. See Temporary Measures, supra note 191, art. 7 (prohibiting work units and
individuals involved with the securities trade from interfering with the market).
239. Marcus NV. Brauchli, Chaotic Change: Beijing's Grip Weakens as Free Enter-
prise Turns into Free-for-All, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1993, at Al.
240. See infra Section IV.C.1 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of
government insiders who are beyond the scope of regulatory authority).
241. Temporary Measures, supra note 191, art. 5.
242. Id.; see Zhao Zhengbing et al., supra note 128. at 18 (dividing the twenty-
six categories of inside information into two types: those relating to important actions
or events that occurred within the company and those relating to facts about or in-
volving the company).
243. See Shanghai Measures, supra note 188, art. 39(2) and (6) (defining inside
trading broadly, to include both direct and indirect use of inside information).
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4. Sanctions for Insider Trading
Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji has stated that the policing of the securities
market should focus on implementing the following four principles:
Legal system, supervision, self-discipline, and standardization [fazhi,
jianguan, zilu, guifan].24 These principles work well with two com-
mon Chinese aphorisms about the legal system: youfa biyi (laws must be
enforced) and zhifa biyan (enforcement must be strict). 24' These char-
acters translate, in practice, to a threefold system of administrative, civil,
and criminal sanctions for insider trading.
a. Administrative Sanctions
i. National Regulations
Both the Temporary Regulations and the Temporary Measures provide
for a RMB 50,000 to RMB 500,000 fine for insider trading,246 and also
permit the confiscation of "illegally-obtained stocks and other illegal in-
come."247 Furthermore, for insider trading by the directors, officers, or
other insiders connected with an issuer during a public offering, a wider
range of sanctions is available.2' In addition to criminal liability,249
"an issuer who commits insider trading during the issuance of securi-
ties . .. can receive a reprimand .... have illegal income confiscated,
pay a fine, or have its issuance approval stopped or canceled."' ' 0
Administrative sanctions also exist for de facto insider trading. 25
De facto insiders who violate the trading prohibitions "by either directly
or indirectly holding or trading stock, except for those instructed to sell
244. Chen Maodi, Zhu Rongji Speaks Highly of Role Played by Stock Markets,
ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINESE SEC. NEws], Dec. 20, 1995, at 1, translated
in FBIS DAu.Y REPORT-CHINA, Dec. 29, 1995, at 30, 30, FBIS-CHI-95-250.
245. Qian, supra note 53, at 627.
246. Temporary Regulations, supra note 190, art. 72; Temporary Measures, supra
note 191, art. 13.
247. Temporary Regulations, supra note 190, art. 72; Temporary Measures, supra
note 191, art. 13.
248. See Temporary Measures, supra note 191, art. 14 (setting forth sanctions for
insider trading by issuer during the issuance of securities).
249. See supra notes 184-192 and accompanying text (discussing a model criminal
code for insider trading and criminal liability provisions under the Temporary Regula-
tions, Temporary Measures, and Shenzhen Measures).
250. Temporary Measures, supra note 191, art. 14.
251. See Temporary Regulations, supra note 190, art. 72(2) (detailing the 5,000 to
50,000 yuan penalty for de facto insider trading).
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their stock within a definite time, can, according to the specific circum-
stances, be assessed one or both of the following: confiscation of the
illegal income, or a RMB 5,000 to RMB 50,000 fine."n
ii. Exchange-Specific Measures
Violators of the Shanghai Measures' insider trading provisions may
receive a fine ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 yuan.'5 For serious of-
fenses, the fine can range from 100,000 to 200,000 yuan5' While
there are no specific enforcement measures for articles 41 and 43(4) of
the Shenzhen Measures, which define "insider" and prohibit "insider
trading," the "catch-all" provision of article 93 appears to serve as the
enforcement measure, stating that "in the issuance, trading, and settle-
ment process those who employ fraud or other illegal methods of gain-
ing profit are subject to... a fine of up to 5% of the total sum in-
volved, [and/or] confiscation of the securities." '
Both exchanges have administrative sanctions for de facto insider
traders?5 6 Violators of the Shenzhen Measures' de facto insider trading
prohibition face the possibility of a 20,000-50,000 yuan fine from the
(local) Administrative Bureau of Industry and Commerce, or other ap-
propriate measures that the competent authorities may impose.5 In
addition, the Shenzhen Measures allow "a reprimand from the work unit,
discharge [kaichu liuyong], removal from public office, and other admin-
istrative measures5 8 Securities related enterprises may not employ
public officials discharged under these provisions.' 59
252. Id
253. Shanghai Measures, supra note 188, art. 75(6).
254. Id. Employees of an institution, who have an administrative/control relation-
ship to or are directly administratively subordinate to an issuer of shares and the
other knowledgeable people with relations to stock issuers or traders, however, face
5,000 yuan to 50,000 yuan fine if engaged in the prohibited activities. Id., arts. 40
and 75(7).
255. Shenzhen Measures, supra note 187, art. 93(l)-(2).
256. See id., arts. 88(l)-(2), 93(3) (detailing the penalties for insider trading);
Shanghai Measures, supra note 188, art. 75(7) (providing a 5,000 to 50,000 yttan fine
for engaging in de facto insider trading).
257. Shenzhen Measures, supra note 187, art. 88(l)-(2). "Competent authorities"
can also be translated as "appropriate agency" or "agency-in-charge."
258. d
259. Id. art. 93(3). Kaichu liuyong differs from "removal from public office
[kaichu gongzhiJ" because it implies a formal termination, but with the opportunity for
the official to redeem himself within a limited time and be reinstated.
1996] 1003
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
In Shanghai, violators of the local de facto insider provisions also
face a fine ranging from 5,000 to 50,000 yuan.m° A violator, however,
may well find himself facing the same punishments as a de facto insider
in Shenzhen (reprimands, discharge, removal from office, and so
forth)"' even though the regulations do not explicitly detail the form
of punishment. Violators may face unspecified party discipline for viola-
tion of the party prohibitions on trading in either market.
2 62
b. Civil Sanctions
Civil sanctions also exist as an alternative or a supplement to admin-
istrative sanctions." The Temporary Regulations imply a civil remedy
for insider trading which is strikingly similar to the American derivative
suit, ' where a shareholder sues the company's directors or officers on
behalf of the corporation, often seeking restitution (for the company) of
the director's or officer's improper income.2" In China, when a third
party experiences a loss as a result of insider trading, "that person can
institute a civil action for compensation." 66 For insider trading during
a public offering, a separate, but equivalent, provision mandates that an
inside trader return (suochou kuanxiang) improperly obtained income to
the company.27
260. Shanghai Measures, supra note 188, art. 75(7).
261. See id. art. 78 (setting forth further disciplinary measures, in addition to the
monetary penalties under article 75(5), to include a reprimand from the work unit, as
well as other sanctions imposed by the work unit).
262. See Brauchli, supra note 239, at Al (discussing the Communist Party leaders'
efforts to ban party officials from participating in the stock markets).
263. Cf. Temporary Measures, supra note 191, art. 77 (indicating that civil laws
governing insider trading require an individual engaging in insider trading practices to
relinquish his gains and face further penalties).
264. See id. (setting forth the civil law sanction against insider trading, which re-
quires compensation and relinquishment of profits)
265. See generally Scott R. Haiber, Derogating the Derivative: Tandycrafts, Inc. v.
Initio Partners and the Role of Attorney's Fees in Shareholder Litigation, 3 DFPAUL
Bus. LJ. 213 (1991) (emphasizing the importance of derivative suits in maintaining
procedural balance between shareholders and corporate management); Harold Demsetz,
A Commentary on Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law, 71 COR-
NELL L. REV. 352 (1986) (commenting on a critique of the derivative suit by empha-
sizing the importance of sustaining shareholder's interest in the modem corporation).
266. Temporary Regulations, supra note 190, art. 77.
267. Temporary Measures, supra note 191, art. 14.
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c. Criminal Sanctions
A recent article on software piracy in China posed the following
question:' "Violators of software and other copyrights face a harsh
scale of punishment those making 'huge' profits face up [to] three years
in prison plus fines, while those making 'extremely huge profits' face
seven years plus fines. Will the same principles be applied for insider
trading and corporate fraud?"' 69
The author of the Computer Business Review article might not be
surprised to learn that while, in theory, criminal liability for insider
trading exists in China, this punishment has not yet been imple-
mented in practice t The Temporary Regulations provide that viola-
tions of the insider trading provisions "which constitute a crime can be
subject to criminal liability."tm Similarly, the Temporary Measures
state that "insiders who leak inside information, in addition to the
above-mentioned provisions [regarding administrative finesm], still
must, under the government's other provisions, face charges of [crimi-
nal] guilt." 4 Criminal liability may also exist on the exchange lev-
el. 5 The "catch all" provision of article 93 of the Shenzhen Mea-
sures ' 6 states that "the serious plots can be [concurrently] referred to
the judiciary for resolution[,]" which implies criminal liability.
268. Huge Penalties, CoMPUTER Bus. R., Aug. 1, 1994, at *1, available in
WESTLAW, COMBUSR Database, 1994 WL 2318163.
269. Id.
270. Cf. Charlene Fu, Fraud Runs Rampant on China's Poorly Regulated Stock
Exchanges, EDMONTON J., Jan. 3, 1994, at D2, available in WESTLAW, EDMTNJNL
Database, 1994 WL 8505250 (stating that government regulators frequently lack the
authority and knowledge to fully enforce securities regulations).
271. He might also not be surprised to learn that enforcement of these laws is lax
and that harsh punishments are often not implemented. See infra Section V.A. and
accompanying notes (citing the many instances when the foreign press exposed
China's disregard of patent and copyright infringements).
272. Temporary Regulations, supra note 190, art. 78.
273. See Temporary Measures, supra note 191, art. 13(1) (penalizing insider trad-
ing by a fine of at least 50,000 yuan, but no more than 500.000 yuan, and by con-
fiscation of the stock certificate and all benefits derived therefrom).
274. ld.
275. See Temporary Regulations, supra note 190, art. 78 (setting forth criminal
liability for violation of securities regulations).
276. See supra note 255 and accompanying text (quoting article 93 of the
Shenzhen Measures, which penalizes the use of fraud or other illegal methods to gain
profit in the securities market).
277. Shenzhen Measures, supra note 187, art. 93(4).
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Because at present, China has no specific criminal offense for insider
trading,27 these provisions are without force, though that will change
in the future. A recent Chinese law review article advocates the imposi-
tion of criminal liability for insider trading, 9 and even presents some
model criminal code language toward that end.' 0 A recent draft of the
securities law reportedly contains a provision that makes insider trading a
crime punishable by a five-year jail term."2 The passage of such a law
will expedite the implementation of existing criminal liability provisions,
and increase the penalties for insider trading exponentially. While the Chi-
nese courts have proven to be weak in deciding civil cases, 2 no one
doubts their ability to quickly impose criminal penalties in cases of econom-
ic crime.
At present, only administrative sanctions are effective deterrents to, or
punishment of, insider trading.23 This is likely to change after the passage
of the Securities Law, 4 which should, in addition to prescribing sanctions
for violations of the Securities Law, explicitly provide a criminal cause of
action which will place prosecutions of insider traders under the authority of
the insider trading provisions.' Civil causes of actions will also become
more important as the Chinese legal system develops and the courts become
widely accepted enforcers of individual rights.
C. ENFORCEMENT OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS
1. Challenges and Problems in Enforcement
This evaluation cannot end without an explicit recognition of the prob-
lems in enforcing these sanctions. The deficiencies of the Chinese equity
278. See Zhao Zhengbing et al., supra note 128, at 20 (referencing article 8 of
the Temporary Regulations, which imposes criminal liability on insider trading).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. China Drafts Regulations, Stiffer Penalties for Fraud Securities: Legislation is
Aimed at Boosting Confidence in Markets, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter Legis-
lation].
282. Cf. Brauchli, supra note 239 (pointing out the apparent "breakdown of social
order" in China as the central government increasingly loses control over the provinc-
es).
283. See Kahn, supra note 80, at 9 (discussing the suspension and fining of a
securities brokerage house in Shanghai).
284. See Legislation, supra note 281, at 3 (detailing the criminal sanctions for
violating the proposed securities laws).
285. Id.
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markets are well-known;26 Chinese officials themselves freely admit that
they are some of the riskiest in the world. r Zhou Daojiong, chairman of
the CSRC, stated that "our country's securities market is still at its initial
stage with some congenital deficiencies and non-standard performances,
such as an imperfect legal system, lack of powerful supervision and man-
agement."
'2
A primary deficiency in the insider trading regulations is the inability to
discipline government officials and party cadres.? 9 As Zhou noted,
regulators' abilities to detect and address insider trading must be im-
proved.' The CSRC needs control over more resources, and needs to re-
cruit and educate more trained regulators.29' The primary goal of the
CSRC should be to discipline the market players, traders, underwriters, and
issuers,' although the problem of government insiders, who are largely
beyond the scope of the CSRC's authority, still remains.P
The central government is still the largest investor, and it lacks internal
discipline.9 4 For example, the Guangdong provincial government owns
286. See Fu, supra note 270, at D2 (noting one of the many examples of fraud
within the Chinese stock markets and the difficulties of enforcing or implementing
existing regulations).
287. Walker & Nickerson, supra note 83, at 28; Tarbutton, supra note 37, at 412.
288. China Regulator Won't Tolerate Market Irregularities, Dow JONES INT'L NEvs
SERV., Dec. 5, 1995, available in WESTLAW, DJINS Database [hereinafter lrregularities].
289. Brauchli, supra note 239, at Al.
290. Irregularities, supra note 288.
291. See also DALU ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG XIANKUANG TE PRESENT STATE OF
THE MA]NLAND'S SEC. MARKET] 186 (1994) (discussing the inadequate technology and
experience of the securities regulators); Fu, supra note 270, at D2 (stating that the CSRC
staff lacks experience and knowledge about the securities market).
292. Barry Porter, CITIC Official: Securities Market to Improve, S. CHINA MORN-
ING PosT, Dec. 15, 1995, at 6. Until very recently, Chinese accounting firms relied
on 70- and 80-year-old accountants with pre-revolution experience and education to
manage their books, because they were the only personnel in the country with any
accounting experience. Karmel, supra note 121, at 1112, n.31.
293. See China Securities Watchdog Urges Uniformity, AGENCE FR.-PRESS., May
8, 1994, available in WESTLAW, AFP-Eng Database, 1994 WL 9613902 ("Insider
trading, involving communist party officials, local bureaucrats and issuing companies,
is prevalent on China's two formal stock exchanges established in 1991 in Shanghai
and Shenzhen. While the situation has improved as the CSRC - established in Octo-
ber last year - has gained in size and experience, Liu [Hongru, then-head of the
CSRCI said many problems persisted.").
294. Karmel, supra note 121, at 1118; see also Heany Sender, CHINA. Rigger Mor-
tis, FAR E. ECON. REV. May 26, 1994, at 80 (discussing government participation in the com-
modities markets).
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Guangdong Investment, which enables Guangdong Investment to acquire
businesses and land at below-market rates.295 This kind of public-private
overlap only increases the natural ability of government officials to make
killings on inside information of future political events, especially in the
Hong Kong market.2 6 The party and the government need to demonstrate
a greater amount of discipline over their own members, or allow an outside
body, such as the CSRC, to step in and administer discipline for trading
violations.
Zhou also remarked on the "imperfect legal system," which needs to be
improved.2' A market "in a country with all-new securities practices, lim-
ited rights for redress of grievances, and a weak, constantly changing consti-
tution is a dangerous market indeed.""29 Obviously, the country needs a
comprehensive securities law, a unified regulation system, and a way of
disciplining the few companies that refuse to obey the limits of the regula-
tions." ° The implementation of criminal punishments and private civil
causes of action is also important. These changes require a better training of
the judiciary, or at least a select group of judges trained in securities mat-
ters, and a stricter enforcement of judicial judgments.
There is also a structural weakness that Zhou overlooked: an information-
al deficit.0 Average investors need both more information on the listed
295. Louise do Rosario, Child- Prodigy: Guangdong Investment Can't Help But
Grow in Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON. REv., Sept. 15, 1994, at 70.
296. Hugo Gurdon, International: Communists Milk Colony's Stock Market, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 19, 1993, at 12.
297. See Irregularities, supra note 288 (citing in detail the problems inherent in
the Chinese securities market at such an early stage of its development).
298. Karmel, supra note 121, at 1118.
299. Cf. Fu, supra note 270, at *4-*5 (demonstrating deficiencies in the Chinese
market).
300. See CHINA MARKET DEV. REP., supra note 148, at 116 (stating that one of
the three problems in the Chinese stock market is the lack of control over some
corporations).
301. In the context of insider trading, however, allowing insider trades to take
place may aid, rather than hamper, information disclosure. When market observers
become aware of insider trading, they will act accordingly, and the information will
quickly diffuse throughout the entire market. In China, however, because the financial
press is not as free as in western countries, and because investors may be thousands
of miles away from each other in a nation with an underdeveloped telecommunicat-
ions infrastructure, the information discovery of insider trading might be limited to
merely observing changes in stock prices. This is an inefficient disclosure method, be-
cause it is difficult to pinpoint the cause of a stock change, in the absence of other
information, and may not fulfill an exchange's goal of information sharing. Cf.
Tarbutton, supra note 37, at 428-29 (stressing the importance of disclosure require-
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companies and the education or experience to interpret the information they
are able to obtain!' Recent examples of government crackdowns on jour-
nalists who report unflattering economic data are disturbing,"as as is the
widespread lack of understanding of the workings of the stock marketC'
2. Hopes for Improvement
Fortunately, reforms are proceeding.3 The first example of progress is
in the legal system.3  China's forthcoming Securities Law" will ad-
dress insider trading, and will extend the reach of insider trading sanctions
by explicitly prescribing criminal sanctions for insider trading!' It is
hoped that the creation of criminal sanctions will go a long way toward
curbing insider trading.
Improved detection and administrative punishment of insider trading
violations also seem likely. On the national level, the CSRC is becoming
more active. More staff have been hired, bringing the manpower level
up to 1,000 personnel from 100 in February, 1994."'3'0 Responding to
ments that penalize not only overt falsifications, but negligence as well).
302. Karmel, supra note 121, at 1118.
303. China's Closed Door, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1996, at A14 (editorial); Rone
Tempest & Chris Kraul, China Restricts Flow of Economic, Financial News, LA.
TmEs, Jan. 17, 1996, at 1. Contra Leu Siew Ying, China's Controls Over News
Wires Leaves Shanghai Traders Unfazed, AGENCa FR.-PRESSE, Jan. 17, 1996. available
in WESTLAW, AFP-Eng Database, 1996 WIL 3789538 (showing lack of concern
among traders).
304. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (describing short-term, rumor-based
investing by many Chinese); Cf. Peter C. Du Bois, Will China Sacrifice Favored
Trading Status with U.S. on the Altar of Domestic Politics? BARRO,'s, May 2, 1994,
at 10; Jeff Randall, Smith Aims for Broking License in Shanghai, THE Ti.IES (Lon-
don), Apr. 17, 1994, at 3-2 (both noting investors' lack of sophistication).
305. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 84, at 10 (discussing impending legislation);
infra note 309 and accompanying text (describing CSRC's increased activism); infra
note 327 and accompanying text (detailing increase in local oversight).
306. Walker, supra note 84, at 10. See China Plans New Rules on Insider Trad-
ing, AstAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1994, at 19 (mentioning the imminence of a new
Chinese securities law). See also China Drafts Regulations, Stiffer Penalties for Fraud,
L.A. TmiES, Jul. 4, 1994, at D3 (discussing the forthcoming securities law).
307. Walker, supra note 84, at 10. See China Plans New Rules on Insider Trad-
ing, supra note 306, at 19 (demonstrating that the law is already two years behind
schedule).
308. China Drafts Regulations, Stiffer Penalties for Fraud. L.A. TMEs, July 4,
1994, at D3.
309. Securities Watchdog, supra note 142, at 2.
310. Id.
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Chairman Zhou's exhortation that, "[w]e must see to it that all laws are ob-
served, that law-breakers are dealt with, and that laws are strictly, justly and
impartially enforced[,]" 3" the CSRC has begun to flex its regulatory mus-
cle.312 The first significant prosecution was in February, 1994, when the
CSRC fired Xiangfan Credit & Investment, a securities broker, RMB 2
million and confiscated a further RMB 16 million3 3 for trading on inside
information.3 14 This prosecution is all the more notable for the fact that
Agricultural Bank of China, which owns Xiangfan, is a major state-owned
commercial bank and policy lender.315 Even the normally staid Economist
gushed, "[tihat one successful prosecution puts China streets ahead of some
far more developed markets. Switzerland and Italy have yet to bring a suc-
cessful prosecution under their insider-trading laws. Japan has nabbed just
one culprit since it banned the practice back in 1989.,316
This is not an isolated example of regulatory muscle-flexing. The efforts
of regulators were at least partially responsible for the removal or forced
resignation of 110 directors, chairpersons and presidents of 56 publicly trad-
ed Chinese companies, on charges of corruption, old age or incompe-
tence.317 Indeed, CSRC officials now institute investigations on their
own, 318 without waiting for instructions from the State Council. 3 9 This
regulatory zeal has begun to affect the behavior of listed firms. Recently,
Shanghai Forever Bicycle fired a managing director after he helped friends
311. Present, Future of Stock Market Examined, ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO
[CHINESE SEC. NEws], Nov. 30, 1995, at 8, translated in FBIS DAILY RE-
PORT-CHNA, Jan. 4, 1996, at 36, 38.
312. Turfing Insider-traders Out, ECONOMIST, July 16, 1994, at 67; PRC Securities
Arm To Probe Irregularities in Listed Firms, XINHUA, Jan. 20, 1996, reprinted in
FBIS DAILY REPORT-CHINA, Jan. 23, 1996, at 51, 51, FBIS-CHI-96-015.
313. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
314. Turfing Insider-traders Out, supra note 312, at 67; Mitchell A. Silk, Cracking
Down on Economic Crime: Will China's Latest Anti-Corruption Campaign Have Any
Impact? CHINA Bus. REV., May 1, 1994, at *8-*9, available in WESTLAW, Allnews
Database, 1994 WL 11291268.
315. Turfing Insider-traders Out, supra note 312, at 67 (explaining ownership of
Xiangfan).
316. Id.
317. On the Record: International, ORLANDO SEINTINEL, Apr. 7, 1995, at B5.
318. See Henry Sender, Local Offices Authorized Limited Supervision Over Secu-
rities Market, AsIA INFO DAILY NEWS SERv., Mar. 26, 1996, at 7, available in
WESTLAW, Allnews Database, 1996 WL 8952811 (describing increased authority of
local CSRC offices).
319. Id.
1010 [VOL. 11:6
CHINESE STAKEHOLDERS
buy shares in the company before the initial public offer.? In November
1994, Guangzhou Shipyard filed information with the Stock Exchange of
Hong Kong indicating that several executives of the company had violated
Chinese insider trading laws
The CSRC plans to be even more active in the future 2 It has prom-
ised that it will "suspend the underwriting rights of securities firms with
irregular actions, and will turn down applications from the firms involved to
-issue stocks."'3' It is also looking to learn from the experiences of other
market regulators, including the American Securities and Exchange Com-
mission,324 the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission,3" and
the Monetary Authority of Singapore.'
Oversight on the local level is also increasing.' The Shanghai govern-
ment has instituted a requirement that all securities consulting institutions re-
register with the authorities?' It is even possible to foresee an end to the
battles over regulatory jurisdiction between the local exchanges and the na-
tional CSRC3 9 Also, the State Council has endorsed self-regulation with-
in the industry,3 0 which seems to be at least a partial answer to the prob-
320. Henny Sender, Hong Kong: Cold Feet, FAR E. ECON. Rav., Dec. 15, 1994, at 68.
321. Id.
322. PRC Securities Arm To Probe Irregularities in Listed Firms, supra note 312,
at 51.
323. PRC: CSRC To Ban Unfair Competition in Underwriting Stocks, XINHUA,
Feb. 7, 1996, reprinted in FBIS DAILY REPORT--CHNA, Feb. 7, 1996, at 45, 46,
FBIS-CHI-96-026.
324. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC and China Securities Regula-
tory Commission Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Formalize Cooperative Rela-
tionship, (news release), available in WESTLAV, Allnews Database, 1994 WIL
150804, SEC 94-35.
325. Hong Kong and China Watchdogs To Cooperate on Futures Markets, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., July 5, 1995, at 15.
326. Barry A. Rider, Global Trends In Securities Regulation: The Changing Legal Cli-
mate, 13 DicK. J. INT'L L 513, 547 (1995); see Cdna, Singapore Join In Regulating Secu-
rities Trading, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Dec. 1, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnaw
database, .1995 WL 7716569 (announcing the signing of Memorandum on Cooperation in
Regulating Securities Trading).
327. See Shanghai to Reregister Securities Advisers, XINHUA, Dec. 22, 1995, re-
printed in FBIS DAILY REPORT-CHINA, Dec. 26, 1995, at 49, FBIS-CHI-95-247
(discussing the Shanghai government's new registering requirement).
328. Id.
329. Chan, supra note 139, at I (discussing "red tape documents" - papers with
instructions and guidelines from higher authorities).
330. Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Guanli Zanxing Banfa [Provisional Measures for the
Oversight of Securities Exchange], art. 43, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan
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lem of an insufficient enforcement mechanism.33' The CSRC seems to be
banking on its success, and hoping that this future enforcement will come
from the developing group of domestic institutional investors.332
Another developing area of securities regulations enforcement involves
the public.333 An awareness of the finite nature of the CSRC's investiga-
tive capabilities led to the creation of a reward system for reporting illegal
securities trading.3 4 The Temporary Measures state that "when a report
from the public concerning securities fraud and other illegal securities be-
havior [is submitted], if [the report] is verified, a reward may be given to
the one making the report."335
Unfortunately, the criticism that China possesses an excessively weaklegal system 336 still rings true. 337 Many of the above-mentioned improve-
ments in securities law hinge on the regulatory power of the CSRC.338 For
remedies and sanctions that rely upon the Chinese courts, the future is still
dim. While stating that the "Chinese court system is capricious, communist
and presumptively corrupt, 339 may be a bit extreme and overbroad, the
new commercial cases do place an undeniable strain on an ill-equipped and
undertrained judiciary. 34 Training judges is the most long term of activi-
ties, and will require a large investment, both in time and financial resourc-
es, by the Chinese government if civil actions for insider trading are ever to
become a viable option.
Fagui Huibian 2-127.
331. Kahn, supra note 163, at S3 (discussing the impact of move to long-term
investors from speculators).
332. See id. ("[Chinese authorities] hope that institutional investment from Chinese
pension funds, mutual funds and insurance firms will make the markets less volatile.
They've got a tough battle ahead.").
333. See Temporary Measures, supra note 191, art. 27 (providing a reward to the
person who reports securities violations).
334. Id.
335. Id.; cf. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15
U.S.C. § 78(a) (providing a reward of up to 10 percent of the penalty for informants
whose tips lead to the successful prosecution of an inside trader).
336. See Geoffrey Crothall, Courts Pledge to End Corruption, S. CHINA MORNING
PosT, Aug. 31, 1992, at 6 (discussing the lax and inconsistent enforcement of securi-
ties regulations by Chinese courts).
337. James D. Zirin, Markets and the Rule of Law, FORBES, Sept. 12, 1994, at 114.
338. See, e.g., Chan, supra note 139, at I (discussing the powers and duties of
various securities regulators); PRC: CSRC to Ban Unfair Competition in Underwriting
Stocks, supra note 323, at 46 (explaining recent actions of CSRC); Silk, supra note
314, at *8 (detailing the impact of CSRC's actions).
339. Zirin, supra note 337, at 114.
340. Crothall, supra note 336, at 6.
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One hopes that an invigorated CSRC will more than compensate for the
slow rate of improvement in the judiciary, and enforcement of the securities
laws will proceed at a reasonably fast pace.
V. IS THE HOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT ILLUSORY? A COMPARISON
WITH THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND AN
EVALUATION OF THE STAKEHOLDER SYSTEM
Thus far, this article has argued that the CSRC and the courts will mean-
ingfully implement and enforce the new insider trading regime in China.
While this initially seems to be at odds with the experience of intellectual
property protection in China, a closer examination of the values underlying
the Chinese legal system provide an explanation for the difference in the
two areas of the law.
A. THE DFICIENCRE= OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECrlON IN
CHINA'
One of the most visible signs of tension between the Chinese and the
American legal systems is the recent disputes over the protection of Ameri-
can intellectual property in China.' The disappointment of westem coun-
341. This article is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of intellectual
property protection in China. Rather, it contrasts the deficiencies of intellectual
property protection with the better possibilities for the enforcement of the insider
trading regulations, and uses the stakeholder theory to explain this discrepancy.
Readers who are interested in a detailed review of Chinese intellectual property
enforcement should consult, inter alia, WVilliam P. Alford, Don't Stop Thinking
About.. . Yesterday: Why There Was No Indigenous Counterpart to Intellectual
Property Laws in Imperial China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 3 (1993); Angela M. Beam,
Comment, Piracy of American Intellectual Property in China, 4 J. INT'L L & PRAC.
335 (1995); Michael N. Schlesinger, A Sleeping Giant Awakes: The Development of
Intellectual Property Law in China, 9 J. CHNES L. 93 (1995); Andrew G. Valder,
Harmonization: Myth and Ceremony? A Comment, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 163
(1994); Jianyang Yu, Protection of Intellectual Property in the P.R.C.: Progress Prob-
lems, and Proposals. 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 140 (1994).
342. See, e.g., China Rejects US Threats over Intellectual Property Rights, AGENCE
FR.-PRESSE, June 30, 1994, available in WESTLAW, AFP-Eng Database, 1994 WL
9558846 (explaining Chinese irritation with United States threats); China Protests U.S.
301 Trade Investigation, ASIAN ECON. NEWs, July 4. 1994. available in WVESTLAW,
Aecon Database, 1994 VL 2087940 (reporting Chinese protests of possible American
sanctions); Jeffrey Parker, "The Fugitive" A Counterfeit Hit in China: Flap With US.
Over Intellectual Property Protection, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 8. 1995, at DI (detailing
dispute over pirated materials).
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tries with Chinese enforcement of intellectual property rights, however, is
not new.343 A 1924 article concluded,
Although China agreed by treaties twenty years ago to enact adequate legisla-
tion to protect foreign trademarks, no law satisfactory to foreign powers has
been promulgated .... It has been suggested by the United States and Great
Britain that extraterritoriality in respect to trade-marks, copyrights and patents
be abolished on condition that China enact proper laws covering the subject.
The wisdom of this recommendation is to be questioned when we consider the
manner in which the Chinese administer their laws.3'
Recent conflicts over software piracy, compact disc piracy, and other
copyright violations have reinforced the perception that Chinese protection
of intellectual property and the enforcement of Chinese laws on piracy are
both inadequate.3' This situation created a growing rift in the Sino-Ameri-
can trade relationship, one that threatens to widen.' American companies
have pressured the United States government to demand that China increase
its policing and punishment of intellectual property violations,37 and the
government, through its Trade Representative, has responded several
times,3" brandishing the 'big stick' of section 301 sanctions.349
It is, of course, possible to endorse the position that the Chinese
government's record on enforcing intellectual property rights is actually
good, given China's level of development,350  and is improving
dramatically. 351 This is similar to the position that the Chinese government
343. Robert T. Bryan, American Trade-Marks, Trade Names, Copyrights and Pat-
ents in China, CHINA L. RE'V. 424, 432 (1924).
344. Id.
345. See Les Blumenthal, In China, Software Piracy Is Flagrant-And Unpunished,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 21, 1995, at Al (examining software piracy); see also Larry
Campbell, Group Challenges CD-ROM Pirates, S. CHINA MORNING POsT, Jan. 17,
1996, at 2 (examining CD-ROM piracy).
346. China Rejects U.S. Threats Over Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 342;
China Protests U.S. 301 Trade Investigation, supra note 342; Parker, supra note 342,
at D1.
347. Lorie Kamath, Hollywood Does Battle With Intellectual Property Pirates:
Accord With U.S. Sets Tone for Foreign Rights in China, EUR. MEDIA Bus. & FIN.,
July 3, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database, 1995 WVL 9242134;
Microsoft Wants Further Action Against Fakers, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 22,
1994, at 1.
348. China Protests U.S. 301 Trade Investigation, supra note 342.
349. Id.
350. China Feels Pressure to Improve Copyright Protection, 6:7 J. PROPRIETARY
RTS. 32 (1994).
351. See id. (demonstrating Chinese efforts to upgrade intellectual property vio-
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holds.O 2 The popular view in the United States, however, is that the en-
forcement is lax,5' even after adjusting for developmental differences be-
tween the two nations. The actual situation seems to be closer to the "lax
enforcement' view, though there are a number of different explanations
for the lax enforcement.0s
B. WHY ARE WE JuSTIIED IN BEING OPm ISTIC ABoUr THE ENFORCEMENT
OF INSIDER TRADING LAWS, GIVEN THE EXPERIENCE OF IPR
ENFORCEMENT?
It may seem curious to be so optimistic about the enforcement of insider
trading laws, given the experience of poor intellectual property protection
under Chinese law in practice. 6 After all, the Chinese government has
made many publicized efforts to stamp out software and compact disc pira-
cy, and many calls for stricter civil and criminal sanctions for intellectu-
lation sanctions); see also China Needs Stricter Enforcement on Copyright Piracy:
Official, AGENCE F;L-PREssE, Apr. 10, 1995, available in WESTL.AW, AFP-Eng Data-
base, 1995 WL 7789466 (quoting Ren Jianxin, president of the Supreme People's
Court, as giving a frank assessment of intellectual property legal protections, and
outlining Chinese efforts to improve the protections).
352. See, e.g., China Rejects U.S. Threats Over Intellectual Property Rights, supra
note 342 (quoting Shen Guofang, then-Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, as
saying, "the Chinese government has done its utmost to ensure the observance of the
law and the prosecution of those who violate the law."); China Protests U.S. 301
Trade Investigation, supra note 342 (same); Intellectual Property Theft Convicted in
China, XINHUA NEWS AGENcY, Jan. 17, 1995, available in 'VESTLAW, Alinews
Database, 1995 WL 7709623 (providing intellectual property enforcement data); see
also Suzanne McElligott, A Better Mindset on Intellectual Property? CHUIcAL VK.,
Sept. 6, 1995, at S7 (outlining Chinese steps to curb patent infringement).
353. Blumenthal, supra note 345, at Al.
354. Seth Faison, Copyright Pirates Prosper in China Despite Promises, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1996, at Al; Steven Mufson, In Fight for Intellectual Rights in Chi-
na, Pirates Still Winning, WASH. PosT, Feb. 18, 1996, at A29; Parker, supra note
342, at D1; Karnath, supra note 347.
355. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 341, at 3 (proposing a cultural explanation for
intellectual property violations); William P. Alford, You Can't Enforce Copyrights
Without Human Rights, NEWSDAY, Feb. 19, 1995 (stating that enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights in China takes a back seat to satisfying basic human needs);
Frankie Fook-Lun Leung, Tradition of Copying in China Fuels the Piracy of Intellec-
tual Property, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, at D2 (acknowledging that piracy is ram-
pant and positing a cultural explanation).
356. See Schlesinger, supra note 341, at 135 (stating that administrative and ju-
dicial decisions do not effectively deter infringement of intellectual property rights).
357. See Steven Mufson, China Raids 2 Plants Making Pirated Discs: U.S. Nego-
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al property pirates.35 In addition, the Chinese government has passed
many laws that appear to make intellectual property piracy illegal beyond
doubt China has a 1982 Trademark Law,359 a 1984 Patent Law (amended
in 1992 ),'6 and a 1990 Copyright Law." The 1987 General Principles
of the Civil Law granted private rights of action for violations of these
laws. 62 In spite of these efforts, pirate compact discs and software plants
continue to chum out products,3 63 and rights are often unenforceable in the
weak Chinese legal system.364 How, then, can one reasonably be optimis-
tic about the future of the insider trading law?
tiators Demanded Crackdown, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1995, at A49 (explaining the
government's efforts to enforce intellectual property laws); see also Richard L.
Holman, World Wire: China Fights Music Piracy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1994, at
All (discussing Chinese government's attempt to deal with intellectual property viola-
tions).
358. See, e.g., Tan Hongkai, Government to Imprison Copyright Buccaneers, CHINA
DAU.Y, May 21, 1994, at 11 (explaining criminal penalties against intellectual property
violations); Microsoft Wants Further Action Against Fakers, supra note 347, at 1
(discussing proposed legal action against pirates); Audio Notes, VIDEO WK., Jul. 18,
1994, available in WESTLAW, Videowk Database, 1994 WL 8725123 (discussing
sanctions for intellectual property violations); Gary M. Hoffman & George T. Marcou,
Who's Stealing America's Ideas? WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1989, at C3 (explaining pro-
posed sanctions to enforce China's intellectual property laws).
359. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa [Trademark Law of the People's
Republic of China], reprinted and translated in [Business Regulation] CHINA L. FOR-
EIGN Bus. (CCH Int'l) T 11-500.
360. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa [Patent Law of the People's Repub-
lic of China], reprinted and translated in [Business Regulation] CHINA L. FOREIGN
Bus. (CCH Int'l) 11-600.
361. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa [Copyright Law of the People's
Republic of China], reprinted and translated in [Business Regulation] China L. For-
eign Bus. (CCH Int'l) 11-700.
362. Schlesinger, supra note 341, at 97.
363. See Kristie M. Kachuriak, Chinese Copyright Piracy: Analysis of the Problem
and Suggestions for Protection of U.S. Copyrights, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 599, 599-600
(1995) (providing estimates of the extent of CD and software piracy in China); Derek
Dessler, Comment, China's Intellectual Property Protection: Prospects for Achieving
International Standards, 19 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 181, 182 (1995) (discussing the
amount of intellectual property piracy despite enacted laws); Katherine C. Spelman,
Combating Counterfeiting, 417 PLIIPAT 309, *7-*8 (1995), available in WESTLAW,
JLR Database (examining how piracy has affected American businesses).
364. Schlesinger, supra note 341, at 135; see Kachuriak, supra note 363, at 609-
610 (evaluating the Intellectual Property courts in China).
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1. There are more stakeholders behind insider trading enforcement.
The enforcement of intellectual property rights and insider trading prohi-
bitions are two entirely different matters, however. The theory that best
explains this disparate treatment is the stakeholder theory of jurispru-
dence?' The Chinese people perceive insider trading and intellectual
property piracy very differently: Chinese stakeholders are both directly and
indirectly involved in the securities markets, all the way down to the work-
ing class individual investor, few Chinese, however, have a stake in the
enforcement of intellectual property rights.3
At the same time, it is important to note that the primary domestic stakes
in intellectual property are undertaken in the interests of furthering China's
bid for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership,"' and to avoid re-
prisals, such as the American section 301 measures!6' The long history of
poor intellectual property protection in China indicates that these "stakes" in
intellectual property right enforcement are not strong enough to overcome
apathy or popular opinion against the strict protection of (mostly foreign)
intellectual property. Furthermore, as the Chinese government is no longer
threatened by the possibility of United States trade sanctions' and foreign
365. See discussion supra part II (explaining stakeholder theory of jurisprudence as
a legal system in which "a wide cross-section of citizens must agree that the law is
in their own interests" for the law to be legitimate and realistically enforceable).
366. It is interesting to note, however, that anecdotal evidence suggests that the
enforcement of domestic intellectual property rights against domestic and foreign in-
fringers is improving, or at least is receiving more attention. See Kang Bing, Manag-
ers Call for Better Enforcement, CHNA DAILY, Oct. 11, 1994 (noting the difficulties
of enforcing the Jianlibao soft drink market); Chinese Composers Sue Matsushita on
Copyright, AsIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 1994, at 5 (reporting one of the first Chi-
nese plaintiffs in an intellectual property violation case).
367. Id.
368. See, e.g., Myles Getlan, TRIPS and the Future of Section 301: A Compara-
tive Study in Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 173, 191-92
(1995) (mentioning that threatening China with Section 301 proceedings caused China
to pass a new copyright law in 1990); Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301
in Creating Long Term Copyright Protection for U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRA-
CUSE J. INT'L L. & Com. 29 (1995) (stating that Special 301 is designed to list the
countries that have committed flagrant violations against American intellectual property
as a way of threatening retaliation); Meredith A. Harper, International Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights in the 1990s: Will Trade Barriers and Pirating Practices
in the Audiovisual Industry Continue? 25 CAL. N. Irr'. LJ. 153, 165-66 (1994)
(stating that the United States Trade Representative "may use Special 301 to sanction
those countries refusing to enforce piracy laws.").
369. See Tan Tam How, Sanction Threats Hurt Overall Trade Ties, China Tells
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interference with its WTO application,37 one may conclude that these
stakes diminish as time passes.37 Also, because both stakes are macroeco-
nomic, China has no vested interest in protecting intellectual property on the
individual scale. There is no real impetus, in the absence of extreme en-
forcement measures by the authorities, for individual economic actors to
foreswear piracy.
Western lawyers and politicians have yet to officially recognize the reali-
ties of the situation.2 Instead of sponsoring measures that would create
more domestic stakeholders, they concentrate on enforcing their rights in an
inhospitable climate.3' s This failure by westerners to recognize the real in-
centives of the Chinese people results, in practice, in a situation that requires
so much force on the part of westerners that it destroys any real incentive
for the Chinese to enforce the laws themselves. This approach is reflected in
the attitudes of many western lawyers.374 One western-trained Chinese
lawyer recently captured the essence of the 'American lawyer' approach in
an newspaper interview:375
As a U.S.-trained Chinese lawyer practicing in Beijing, it is my belief that
American interests in intellectual-property protection can be best served by
engaging Chinese courts, not avoiding them. The value of winning a case
under Chinese law goes well beyond specific damage awards, because it puts
US, STRAITS TIMEs (Singapore), Feb. 2, 1996, at 28 (revealing that the United States
threats to impose sanctions on China will hurt overall trade and economic ties);
Renee Schoof, U.S. Sanctions Would Cut Important China Market, But Officials
Shrug, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 5, 1995, at *2, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus
Database, 1995 WL 4370467 (stating that "the sanctions are 'no big deal,' Foreign
Trade Minister Wu Yi told Hong Kong reporters.").
370. Cf Karen E. House, Chinese Premier Singles Out U.S. as Obstacle to Fast
GAT Entry, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1994, at A19 (discussing Chinese Premier Li
Peng's statement that United States is the greatest obstacle to China's membership in
GATr).
371. The development of domestic stakes in the protection of intellectual property,
however, may very well offset this weakening, as the Chinese economy develops and
begins to earn more revenue from high technology and intangible products like com-
puter software. See Cinque, Note, Making Cyberspace Safe for Copyright: The Pro-
tection of Electronic Works in a Protocol to the Berne Convention, 18 FOROHAM
INT'L L.J. 1258, 1288-89 (1995) (arguing that the failure of nations to provide laws
protecting intellectual property stifles the development of a technological infrastruc-
ture).
372. Qiao Gangliang, Don't Shy Away From Litigation in China, ASIAN WALL ST.
J., Mar. 29, 1995, at 6.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
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all Chinese people-consumers and competitors-on notice that foreign busi-
nesses will use legal remedies to demand fair treatment from the Chinese
legal systemY776
This approach finds support in the United States government n The
House of Representatives Democratic leader, Dick Gephardt, recently wrote
to the then-U.S. Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, "[tihe Chinese gov-
ernment needs to understand how seriously we view these violations and
that we are prepared to take action if they choose to ignore their commit-
ments." What the lawyer and Congressman Gephardt both fail to ad-
dress are the root causes of the reluctance or inability of the Chinese author-
ities to enforce intellectual property laws.
Many western observers have noted that the absence of domestic eco-
nomic stakes in intellectual property enforcement is related to lax enforce-
ment." Some westerners have even sided with the Chinese and endorsed
a double standard on the enforcement of intellectual property rights in devel-
oping nations.3" This view recognizes that effective enforcement will only
occur when large numbers of Chinese citizens have a stake in the protection
of intellectual property, and explains why it is reasonable to expect insider
trading laws (and, indeed, all securities laws) to be more vigorously en-
forced in the future. Because there are strong domestic, foreign, and gov-
ernmental stakes in the securities industry, -' insider trading enforcement
is likely.
376. Id.
377. Letter from Richard Gephardt, Democratic Leader, House of Representatives,
to Mickey Kantor, United States Trade Representative (Feb. 7, 1996). available in
WESTLAW, Allnews Database, 1996 WL 8783114.
378. Id.
379. See Piracy on the High Cs: Should Foreigner's Intellectual Property Always
Be Protected?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 1996, at 17 (acknowledging China's "slack en-
forcement" of intellectual property rules).
380. See id. (arguing that effective enforcement of intellectual property is directly
correlated to the rise of domestic inventors and innovators). See also Chinese Check-
ers, ORANGE CouNTY REGISTE, Feb. 7, 1995, at B8 (advocating the support of free-
market reforms in China in order to foster the natural evolution of an effective,
broad-based intellectual property enforcement regime).
381. See discussion supra Section ll.C (identifying and discussing the stakeholders
in China's securities markets as the small domestic investors, foreign investors, and
the government).
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2. The capital markets stakeholders reflect the legitimate economic interests
of the Chinese government
While the presence of stakeholders in the economy is essential to a cul-
ture of enforcement, it may not be, in the short run at least, a sufficient
condition. In the long run, the mere existence of a large group of
stakeholders will induce a government to enforce laws that are in the
stakeholders' interest, but in the short-term, a convergence of government
and stakeholder interests is necessary to effect widespread enforcement.
Enforcement of the insider trading laws is in the government's interest
because the government's stability and legitimacy rest in large part on the
development of the economy,3" and the market is an integral part of the
Chinese economy." 3 To varying degrees, the market has changed attitudes
toward profit, risk, and return,3" modernized the administration and use of
financial assets,385 taken the responsibility for rating companies and enter-
prises from the government and given it to the market, has changed the
mechanism for raising funds,S and has provided a new channel for for-
eign investment. 87 The market's stability rests, to a great degree, on the
existence and enforcement of a reasoned and transparent regulatory re-
gime,388 and it is likely that this situation will encourage the government
to enforce insider trading (and other securities) laws.
A Chinese decision to vigorously enforce insider trading laws would be
in accord with conclusions of other governments. 9 In many economically
developed nations, governments have concluded that insider trading is harm-
ful to economic growth.3 ° The United States, for example, prohibits insid-
er trading on the grounds that it undermines "the fair and honest operation
382. See Barnathan et al., supra note 88 (stating that the government is dependent
on the performance of the market).
383. Id.
384. Economist on "Breakthroughs" in Securities Market, XINHUA, Nov. 26, 1995,
reprinted in FBIS DAILY REPORT-CHNA, Nov. 27, 1995, at 39, 39, FBIS-CHI-95-
227.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. See Bamathan et al., supra note 88 (stating that market regulation is a priori-
ty in "nations of small investors," where governments fluctuate based on performance
of the market).
389. See infra notes 391-96 and accompanying text (discussing the attitudes toward
and actions against insider trading in the United States, the European Union, Germa-
ny, and Hong Kong).
390. Id.
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of our securities markets"39' based, at least in part, on the fear that the
public will either refuse to invest in a market they perceive as being
"rigged" or will actually be victimized in a rigged market.r The Europe-
an Union also endoises a union-wide upgrading of insider trading laws and
enforcement?' Even Germany and Hong Kong, two governments notori-
ous for turning a blind eye toward insider trading," are beginning to see
the light. In 1994, Germany finally adopted insider trading regulations,
which made insider trading punishable by five years imprisonment,3  and
Hong Kong is'also punishing insider traders?
Intellectual property rights, on the other hand, are different.3 The
alignment of the interests of the Chinese government and foreign
stakeholders is not reflected in the intellectual property rights battles. There
391. INSIDER TRADING AND THE SECURrrIES FRAUD ENFORCE?.ENT ACT OF 1988,
H.R. REP. No. 910, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., quoted in ELizABmn SZOCKYJ, THE
LAw AND INSIDER TRADING: IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 2 (1993) [here-
inaftr SZOCKYJ].
392. Report of the Task Force on Insider Trading, quoted in SzoCKYJ, supra note
391, at 2.
393. See Lynda M. Ruiz, European Community Directive on Insider Dealing: A
Model for Effective Enforcement of Prohibitions on Insider Trading in International
Securities Markets, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217 (1995) (concluding that the
European Union Council Directive, which coordinated regulations on insider trading, is
a successful means by which to combat international insider trading); Stephen J.
Leacock, In Search of a Giant Leap: Curtailing Insider Trading in International Secu-
rities Markets by the Reform of Insider Trading Laws Under European Union Coundil
Directive 891592, 3 TU.SA J. CoNI'. & INT'L L. 51 (1995) (stating that the European
Union has recently taken steps to ensure a "barrier-free securities market").
394. See Ursula C. Pfeil, Note, Finanzplatz Deutschland: Germany Enacts Insider
Trading Legislation, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 137 (1996) (stating that prior to
the enactment of Second Financial Markets Promotion Act in 1994, insider trading
was not a crime").
395. See id. (stating that in 1994, Germany "became the last major rinancial cen-
ter to adopt legislation on prohibiting insider trading.'); Daniel J. Standen, Insider
Trading Reforms Sweep Across Germany: Bracing for the Cold Winds of Change, 36
HARv. INT'L LJ. 177 (1995) (same); Andy Zipser, Review & Preview, BARRON'S.
Dec 26, 1994, at 10, 10 (same).
396. Diane Brady, Trading Trouble, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 6, 1994. at 3; see
also Hong Kong Makes Proposal to Curb Insider Trading, WALL ST. J.. June 30.
1989, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database, 1989 WL-WSJ 481137 (explaining that
Hong Kong's new bill provides tougher sanctions against insider trading).
397. See supra notes 355-57 and accompanying text (describing rampant intellectu-
al property violations and the Chinese government's inability to enforce intellectual
property laws).
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are few domestic stakeholders,"'8 and their interests are not aligned with
those of the government.3' The government is concerned with macroeco-
nomic growth,' and strict enforcement of intellectual property rights
would be a brake on this kind of development. In fact, the lack of intellectu-
al property protection may increase the speed that technology (e.g., the most
advanced software) is disseminated through the economy."' There is also
the darker side of the non-enforcement of intellectual property rights: the
fact that the Chinese government harbors many officials and organs who
directly profit from tolerated piracy, which mitigates against enforce-
ment of the intellectual property rights of foreigners and the small number
of domestic stakeholders.
3. The requests of the capital market stakeholders are realistic
In China, as in all countries, realpolitik is an important consideration in
policy implementation.' An important determinant of a law's enforce-
ment in a country such as China is the impact of the law.' The insider
trading law has a reasonably defined group of activities that it purports to
control, and the requests of the securities markets stakeholders are also real-
istic. Both of these factors increase the likelihood that an effective insider-
trading regime will be fully implemented.'
398. Spelman, supra note 363, at *9.
399. Id. ("Finally, and perhaps most important, the local population must display
the 'will' to enforce punishment when intellectual property rights have been violat-
ed"--another way of stating that the Chinese market must create domestic
stakeholders before enforcement may become a reality).
400. See Schlesinger, supra note 341 (stating that the Chinese government has a
macroeconomic focus on hastening economic growth that is at odds with the interests
of the individual investor).
401. See Cinque, supra note 371, at 1289-90 (claiming that if intellectual property
is digitized, it will disseminate through society more quickly).
402. See Chan Wai-Fong, Resistance To Moves Against CD Piracy, S. CHINA
MORNING PoST, Jul. 25, 1994, at 9 (acknowledging involvement of Chinese officials
in copyright piracy in the southeastern coastal areas).
403. See Laurence P. Harrington, Note, Recent Amendments to China's Patent
Law: The Emperor's New Clothes, 17 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 337, 337 (1994)
(claiming that China is moving toward "realpolitik accommodations between its social-
ist political system and its developing market economy").
404. Id.
405. See supra Section VI.B.2 and accompanying notes (stating that the enforce-
ment of the insider trading laws benefits both stakeholder and the government).
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The stakeholders want enforcement of existing laws, which are supported
by much of the government and the populace.' To legitimately carry out
these laws, the stakeholders plan to use the administrative branch, instead of
the judiciary, for enforcement, and do not intend to harm any legitimate,
established actors in the economy. In fact, the only parties the strict enforce-
ment of insider trading regulations will harm would be the insider traders
themselves. Because government officials cannot openly defend their right
to engage in insider trading, and because the insider traders in general are
not popular, the enforcement of these rules is likely to be uncontroversial.
As in the previous section, the intellectual property interests are different
here as well. The American lawyers' demands are quite severe, when exam-
ined in the context of the developing Chinese legal system., The agenda
of the American lawyers is not only to sue for strict enforcement of the
letter of the intellectual property law,' but to use the Chinese courts as
the instrument of this action.° Either of these actions would be difficult
to enforce. Simultaneously advocating both is simply unrealistic.
4. The capital markets stakeholders have advanced their interests in a
logical, consistent, progressive manner
One of the reasons that the intellectual property laws have failed is that
the Chinese government grafted the mature, fully-formed intellectual proper-
ty laws onto the existing corpus of Chinese law.4t° Any deliberative proce-
dure entered into was not expansive enough to win widespread support, and
there was not much of an opportunity for the Chinese legislators and admin-
istrators to learn from earlier versions or limited applications of the law.4!
Clearly, in a young legal system such as China's, the learning curve is a
406. Id.
407. See Qiao, supra note 372 (stating that westerners' focus on enforcement of
Chinese intellectual property laws ignores the root causes of the Chinese government's
inability to enforce the laws).
408. See id. (advocating that American lawyers should bring suits in Chinese
courts in order to place the Chinese on notice that "foreign businesses will use legal
remedies to demand fair treatment from the Chinese legal system").
409. See iU. at 6 (stating that American intellectual property interests "can best be
served by engaging Chinese courts, not avoiding them").
410. See Schlesinger, supra note 341, at 96-98 (stating that since the Cultural
Revolution in 1978, China has legislated an intellectual property law in a remarkably
short period of time, based on its study of the laws of other nations).
411. See id. at 100-01 (noting that China's first trademark law was "clearly a leg-
islative compromise").
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reality, and trying to impose a new set of legal concepts would better be
done through progressive growth rather than wholesale imposition.
By contrast, in insider trading law, as in the development of a securities
market in general,41 the regulations have developed in a logical, consis-
tent manner.41 The regulations on insider trading began as exchange-level
regulations that erred on the side of safety.414 Two successive waves of
regulations followed,415 and the securities law that will be promulgated in
the future will be able to build on all of these experiences. 416 This incre-
mental approach to creating a comprehensive insider trading law comple-
ments the Chinese attitude toward law,417 and is a better approach for in-
stituting what is essentially the transplant of a foreign law. Stakeholders
have a better chance of seeing insider trading laws implemented and en-
forced when the law is developed systematically.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that China is committed to bringing its exchanges in line
with international standards.41' The stock market is the primary channel
for foreign investment in China,419 and it is needed for China's industries
and enterprises to grow. As a condition of that growth, both domestic and
foreign investors must be confident that adequate safeguards are in place.
The development of the law has been progressive and inclusive,42 and
412. See Matthew D. Bersani, Privatization And The Creation Of Stock Companies
In China, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 301, 303-04 (explaining the Chinese
government's slow, step-by-step progression of privatization laws).
413. See id. at 303 (explaining the logical progression in the development of the
regulations).
414. See supra notes 185-190 and accompanying text (discussing the current Chi-
nese legislation against insider trading).
415. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Temporary
Regulations and the Temporary Measures).
416. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (stating that the new insider trad-
ing provisions should not differ materially from the current regulation).
417. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text (discussing the four Chinese
principles and the two common Chinese aphorisms about the legal system, which
underlie the Chinese insider trading laws).
418. Official Affirms Fund-Raising in Stock Market, CHINA NEws AGENCY
[Zhongguo Xinwen She], Dec. 2, 1995, reprinted in FBIS DAILY REPORT-CHINA,
Dec. 5, 1995, FBIS-CHI-95-233.
419. Id.
420. See supra note 412-13 and accompanying text (stating that regulations have
developed in a logical, consistent manner).
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most indications are that the Chinese government will systematically devel-
op and apply the law.
We need to revise our view of China, and indeed, perhaps of all develop-
ing legal systems. As foreign and domestic lawmakers of all kinds have
discovered, it is probably impossible to foist a legal system on a rebellious
populace.42' What American computer software and movie industries have
discovered is that it is very difficult to impose a system of legal norms upon
a population that does not have a stake in the underlying law. As the com-
parison between insider trading and intellectual property law demonstrates,
the government and a large enough group of the citizenry both need to have
a stake in the enforcement of a given law for a legal transplant to be suc-
cessful.
The presence of a critical mass of stakeholders makes continued develop-
ment and effective enforcement of the insider trading laws possible. This
window of opportunity may constitute a lesson for western intellectual prop-
erty stakeholders. The way to guarantee strict enforcement of intellectual
property rights in China may well be to foster the growth of a class of do-
mestic stakeholders, instead of attempting to force the Chinese courts to pro-
tect the interests of foreign stakeholders. The development of a class of
domestic stakeholders would require a large, long-term commitment (in
terms of effort, money, and perhaps even some opportunity costs from tol-
erated piracy) to the Chinese market, and there is a huge opportunity for
free riding by other companies. '
In contrast to the natural tendency of westerners to demand adherence to
the codified law, the Chinese insider trading experience demonstrated that in
some societies, it would be better to require the legal codes to reflect a
common societal vision. When society-wide consensus on the impropriety of
an action exists, and enough citizens with a stake in prohibiting and punish-
ing the action exist, these two factors cause the legal system to regulate and
the its enforcement to develop naturally.
How far have the Chinese regulators come? A considerable distance. Just
three years ago, "China analysts" reported that "it was unlikely Communist
Party authorities would approve laws banning practices such as insider trad-
421. See supra notes 356, 364 and accompanying text (stating that attempts to leg-
islate and enforce unpopular laws do not effectively deter intellectual property in-
fringernents).
422. This would suggest that an industry coalition might be ideal for fostering the
growth of this class of IPR stakeholders. Such coalitions (e.g., the Business Software
Alliance) already exist, but they constitute enforcement-seeking groups, rather than
groups that could foster change.
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ing." Today, we are posing a different set of questions, concerning in-
creasing compliance and oversight. The very nature of this change demon-
strates that Chinese securities law has made a quantum leap in the area of
insider trading. The reasons for this leap can teach us much about the proper
way to examine legal development in the People's Republic of China.
423. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, West Cited as Model for Law-Making, S. CHINA MORN-
ING POST, Mar. 18, 1993, at 11.
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